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I. Introduction
Having spent considerable time over the last fifty years working with
grassroots groups on social justice issues, I underscore in this article three
attributes that for me are crucial to good lawyering. They are accessibility,
responsiveness, and judgment. While professionally relevant across-theboard, these attributes are especially important when one counsels and
represents individuals or groups who seek to act collectively in coalitions
and who themselves are not paying for the legal services.
In this lawyering context, there are two important differences from the
stereotypic client and lawyer relationship. First, assisting a coalition usually involves interacting with multiple individuals who have different
backgrounds, affiliations, and points of view. Typically the coalition does
not operate hierarchically, and most decisions get made by consensus. In
one way or another, all of the individuals are clients or in client-like positions. Second, meaningful external mechanisms, such as a fee, do not exist
to help hold lawyers accountable to those being assisted. In my experience
in California, it is also rare to have a written retainer agreement, which
is not a professional rule requirement when legal services are provided
for free.' In short, when lawyers work with grassroots coalitions, formal
accountability to the client group often is weak or non-existent.
As a result, lawyers working with coalitions specifically, and not infrequently with grassroots groups generally, have to assume a heightened
responsibility for developing not only an appropriate role conception but
Honorable Raymond L. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of California Hastings
College of the Law. In preparing this article, I greatly appreciated the helpful comments
of Ascanio Piomelli, Bob Prentice, and Calvin Welch.
1. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6147, 6148.
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also the self-discipline needed to keep their actions aligned or reconciled
with the range of varying interests and goals within the client group. In my
view, the key guideposts for internalizing such a sense of role and duty, and
then shaping one's actions accordingly, lie in cultivating a self-reflective
and critical understanding of the considerations involved in being accessible to clients, in being responsive to their concerns, and in using knowledge and experience with good judgment.
To provide substantive grounding for presenting my ideas, I describe at
some length work done since 2007 by students and faculty in the Community Economic Development (CED) Clinic at the University of California
Hastings College of the Law. 2 Most of this work has been done in close
collaboration with grassroots coalitions seeking to influence the plans for
and community benefits from a major development project in San Francisco. The developer was California Pacific Medical Center (CPMC), which
has multiple San Francisco hospital sites. CPMC's original plans included
building a new hospital campus adjacent to the Tenderloin, a diverse lowincome neighborhood in the center of San Francisco, and closing St. Luke's
Hospital, a relatively recently acquired campus located in the low-income
but gentrifying Mission District. St. Luke's had a well-known 150-year history of providing hospital and healthcare services to the poor.
The Hastings CED Clinic provides law students with experience in
navigating the intersections and overlapping nature of law, politics, and
public policy in an advocacy but non-litigation setting. The prospect of litigation is relevant as a potential threat, but if litigation ever were necessary,
it would be referred to other attorneys. Similarly, the Clinic has no hesitancy in reaching out and drawing on the experience and expertise of outside attorneys and consultants in addressing substantive and institutional
issues. Most importantly, Clinic students and faculty constantly learn from
the clients themselves. Given the spread of issues that can come up, especially when interacting with a broad-based coalition, the Clinic always
has new fields to learn and fresh insights to glean. One of the complicating responsibilities, yet an important advantage, of providing legal help
through a law school clinic is that student learning is an equal priority with
providing high-quality legal services. Scholarly as well as activist attention needs to be explicitly paid to lawyering issues often left unaddressed,
particularly those concerning attorney roles and varying societal contexts.
The CED Clinic's involvement regarding CPMC's hospital construction
plans began with raising the prospects of obtaining a Community Benefits
Agreement (CBA)3 from CPMC as part of the development process. While
there was not in the end a CBA, there was a Development Agreement
2. This article presents a first-person account of what happened. The narrative information presented is mostly based on my own notes and observations. I have file copies of
documents for which I have not provided specific citations.
3. For an explanation of CBAs and their use, see Julian Gross, Community Benefits
Agreements, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
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(DA)4 negotiated by three members of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, who substantially relied on an agenda of major issues set by the
Clinic's clients. Along with other provisions intended to benefit the public
and to meet community needs, the DA addressed the respective sizes of
CPMC's proposed new hospital adjacent to the Tenderloin and a replacement hospital on the St. Luke's campus, 5 something which CPMC initially
had no plans to build. The DA also set forth almost $74 million in negotiated cash benefits. These benefits included $40.64 million for affordable
housing; $4 million for community-based workforce development programs; $8.6 million for a healthcare innovation fund, including support
for community health clinics especially in the Tenderloin; $9 million for
public works projects, including $4.45 million for Tenderloin streetscape
and pedestrian safety improvements; and $11.5 million for transportation
and rapid-transit fees. 6
The second stage of the CED Clinic's involvement has concerned monitoring CPMC's compliance with and San Francisco's enforcement of the
DA. While no problems have arisen pertaining to CPMC meeting deadlines for transferring cash payments, its performance in meeting non-cash
DA terms has required continuing attention. The issues raised concern
such matters as the expanded delivery of healthcare services to the Tenderloin poor, promoting employee use of public transportation and carpooling, and meeting employment targets for hiring and retaining healthcare
workers from low-income neighborhoods in San Francisco. Monitoring the
implementation of the DA's terms is an ongoing process. In doing so, other
issues outside the DA terms arise regarding not only CPMC's provisions
of healthcare services but also healthcare needs in San Francisco generally
These other issues have comprised an additional dimension in the assistance and representation provided by the CED Clinic.7
Before providing additional information about the CED Clinic's work
with grassroots activists and using this material to spell out what I mean
by accessibility, responsiveness, and judgment as lawyering attributes, I
DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS

189-204 (Roger A. Clay, Jr.

& Susan R. Jones eds., 2009).
4. Development Agreements are legislatively authorized in San Francisco pursuant to
California Government Code § 65865 and San Francisco Administrative Code chapter 56.
5. CPMC Development Agreement 2 & Exhs. B-1, B-2 (Oct. 2, 2013), http://sf-plan
ning.org/cpmc-documents-download.
6. Id. at 3 & Exh. G at 1.
7. Because of publication limitations, there is not space in this article to discuss these
matters, a leading example of which was CPMC's initial decision to close the last skilled
nursing facility with a subacute care unit in San Francisco, which was on the St. Luke's
Campus. Subacute care units are for individuals who need long-term, life-support services, such as a ventilator to breathe. After community and political pressure largely
generated by the Clinic's clients in alliance with families of the affected patients, CPMC
backed off and decided to open temporarily a subacute care unit on another of its hospital
campuses until the remaining patients died or otherwise left.
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set forth in somewhat broad strokes a number of intertwined political and
professional considerations to position my own perspectives on lawyering
for social change.
II. The Political and Professional Context
In the United States, a neat separation does not exist between law and
politics in the promulgation, enactment, and implementation of public policies. Rooted in our constitutional form of government and commitment to
the rule of law, lawyers and judges in a professional capacity play inordinately central roles in the political process, whether the issues concern the
structure of government or substantive public policy For lawyers professionally, their participation ingovernance or policy matters is mostly as part
of their representation of interest groups, including incorporated businesses
and unions, and various associations, coalitions, or movements, of which
some are highly organized, while others are more loosely coordinated.
In this section, I call attention to three key factors that complicate lawyering when representing groups with limited resources as compared to
well-funded entities. The first has to do with the inherently conservative
nature of legal counseling and representation and the long-term effects of
who most benefits from lawyer involvement in public affairs. The second
has to do with power imbalances in the lawyer-client relationship and how
that affects the dynamics of providing legal assistance in group advocacy
situations. The third has to do with the fluid nature of political circumstances and the difficulties in sustaining over time advantages and benefits
for non-establishment client groups.
In 1831 following his travels in the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville
commented on the special place of the bar and the bench in American politics. He famously observed: "If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation that it is not composed of the rich,
who are united by no common tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and
the bar."8 De Tocqueville considered lawyers "a conservative interest" within
American political culture---a "counterpoise to the democrat element"; specifically, he expected the legal profession as "qualified by its powers, and
even by its defects, to neutralize the vices which are inherent in popular
government." 9 For de Tocqueville, in light of the absence of an entrenched
social aristocracy in the United States, the legal profession's attraction to regularity, order, and stability was a present and necessary source of conservative constraints in the unfolding of American democratic politics.
De Tocqueville was correct in what has been the dominant historical
role played by American lawyers and judges in response to changing social
and economic circumstances. The reasons are twofold: one has to do with
professional habits and commitments as emphasized by de Tocqueville;
the other, not underscored by him, has to do with who has access to lawyers for what purposes.
8. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
9. Id. at 288-89.

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

288 (1954).
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As part of the education and socialization of lawyers, professional values
and approaches are intended to channel and constrain individual behavior.
Reflecting often long-standing traditions, their impact strongly tends to be
cautionary and conservative. One example is the pivotal place of precedent
in legal reasoning. Another fundamental professional commitment is the
duty of loyalty to a client. Professional values are crucial in lawyering, but,
in recognizing how those values play out, so too is identifying who are the
clients and the kind of interests that are advanced and protected.
Both in the past and now, American lawyers in public policy matters
overwhelmingly assist and represent wealthy individual and corporate
interests. While the rich are not monolithic in their views, their financial
ability to pay lawyers on a sustained basis means that ready pools of lawyers are available to represent their interests. In policy advocacy, lawyers
most often are the handmaidens of the wealthy. The extent to which various interests converge or diverge and the extent to which a lawyer's personal views correspond with those of a client are peripheral considerations.
While law and politics are not static and progressive developments arise,
the on-balance impact of the professional work done by lawyers representing group interests has been and continues to favor those who historically
have most benefited from the existing legal and political order.
Those attorneys working with non-establishment groups are a relatively small minority. Moreover, the dispositions, values, and methods of
the legal profession, as de Tocqueville well-understood, mainly promote
conservative decision-making. The underlying paradox for lawyers who
seek to use legal advocacy for progressive social change, including when
invoking constitutional ideals such as equality, is that so much of what
comprises legal professionalism and what eventually results legally and
politically reinforces the status quo. Nonetheless, there are choices in how
lawyers work with client groups on progressive issues and causes that can
make a difference in the degree to which lawyer involvement contributes
to or distracts from the likelihood of success in facilitating the empowerment of traditionally marginalized groups and in obtaining desired policy
outcomes.
This examination leads me to my second point, which pertains to the
effects of power imbalances within the lawyer/client relationship on how
professional responsibilities are carried out, specifically when formal
accountability to clients is weak or non-existent. In these circumstances,
my concerns are with what else needs to happen to further accountability
or to mitigate the effects of such weakness or absence. When the opposite
is the case, for example the payment of a hefty fee, the most likely professional relationship problem is not about accountability but about encouraging lawyers to exercise independent judgment and not avoid telling
clients what they do not want to hear.
The academic literature analyzing what lawyers have done and proscribing what they should do when working with groups seeking progressive social change is voluminous and mostly the product of scholarship
undertaken after the mid-1970s. These works include both social science
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analyses of the impacts of using law in furtherance of social justice 0 and
texts and studies in legal professionalism that address ideas about the roles
of lawyers and lawyering as a process." While some of these works heavily criticize the efficaciousness of progressive efforts, others concentrate on
what can be learned from past shortcomings, mistakes, and successes.
The descriptions and critiques presented in this literature are especially
rich in new terminology, which has had an impact within the academy and
in practice. Certain terms that did not exist before are now fairly ubiquitous. One prominent example is "lawyering" as a word to describe generally what lawyers do professionally.1 2 Another is "client-centeredness" as
a concept for underscoring that clients, not lawyers, are the ultimate decision-makers and for emphasizing the need to inquire explicitly and not
make assumptions about the perspectives, values, understandings, and
goals of clients. 3 Related to client-centeredness are notions of "rebellious"
or "collaborative" lawyering, which has an additional pivotal emphasis
on working in partnership with clients, whether they be individuals or
groups. 1 4 The most frequent catch-all term for describing legal advocacy
for groups seeking progressive social change has been "cause lawyering.""
Two breakthrough events in American legal and political history are
the catalysts for much of the development of this literature. The first is
the NAACP's trailblazing campaign starting in the 1930s to end racial
10. E.g.,

GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW'S ALLURE: How LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES,

AND KILLS POLITICS

(2009);

MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE

(2004); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVER(2001); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHRIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996); MICHAEL W.

SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
SARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
ING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE ANIMAL

MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORMS AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION

(1994);

N. ROSENBERG,
(2d ed. 2008).

GERALD

SOCIAL CHANGE?

THE

HOLLOW

HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT

11. For contemporary clinical legal education, the precedent-setting and now classic
text

is GARY BELLOW

& BEA MOULTON,

THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINI-

(1978). See Symposium: The 25th Anniversary of Gary
Bellow's & Bea Moulton's The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. No. 1 (Fall 2003).
12. One of the earliest uses of the term, if not the first, was in BELLOW & MOULTON.
13. DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, PAUL R. TREMBLAY & IAN S. WEINSTEIN, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (3d ed. 2012).
14. Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427
(2000); GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VIEW OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE (1992). L6pez's conception of legal practice has had a widespread impact
INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY

CAL

on the academic literature regarding progressive lawyering in individual and group situations. See Symposium: Rebellious Lawyering at 25, 23 CLINICAL L.REV. No. 1 (Fall 2016)
and No. 2 (Spring 2017).
15. CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI-

(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006). For an analysis of lawyers from the
other side of the ideological spectrum, see ANN SOUTHXVORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT:
TIES

PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION

(2008).
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segregation, which began with actions and cases setting the stage for the litigation in Brown v. Board of Education. The campaign's climax was the landmark Brown decision in 1954, but the legal struggle encompassed as well the
frustrated course of implementation that followed. 6 While the clients represented by the NAACP were highly courageous, it was the NAACP lawyers
who made the crucial strategic and tactical decisions. The attorneys were the
leading actors in what was institutionally a court-focused approach.
The NAACP campaign became the model for much social cause lawyering that occurred afterwards for a variety of constituent groups and
across a wide range of issues. 7 Such lawyer-centered and judicially dependent strategies for achieving social change have come under much critical
scrutiny. When the focus is on lawyer and client relationships, the chief
criticisms are that this type of approach is too top-down and not mindful
enough about differences of opinion, concerns, and goals among the represented group.' When such strategies are criticized as not sufficiently efficacious, or even counterproductive, in achieving concrete benefits for the
intended constituencies, the main arguments stress that too much credence
was given to judicial decision-making as an instrument for social change
and not enough attention was given to other political and societal means
for garnering long-term support and acceptance. 19
The second key catalytic event was the federal government's funding
of legal services for the poor in 1965 as part of President Lyndon Johnson's
War on Poverty. The pivotal development was the decision of Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) administrators not only to expand the provision
of individual legal representation but also to push for "law reform"-a
multipronged approach utilizing legal assistance and representation of
individuals and grassroots groups to promote and enforce policies beneficial to poor persons overall.20 In terms of lawyer-client relationships, the

16.

RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY

(1976).

17. See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, supra note 10.

18. E.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976) (questioning African American
grassroots support for the NAACP strategy of integrating public schools); cf. TOMIKO
BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL

RIGHTS MOVEMENT 346-56, 369-73 (2011) (highlighting differences between middle class

African Americans who feared losing public school teaching, administrative, and clerical jobs and poor African Americans who viewed desegregation as a way to get a better
education for their children).
19. E.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 10. In a review of Rosenberg's book written shortly
after its initial publication, Malcolm Feeley provides a thoughtful and nuanced analysis
of why this extensively cited work is both important and wrong. Malcolm Feeley, Hollow
Hopes, Flypaper,and Metaphors, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 745 (1992).
20. EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM

126-34 (1974).
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crucial consequence was the untethering of a substantial amount of legal
services funding from direct control by individual and group clients.
Previously, the budgets of legal aid societies were small, and work on
policy advocacy was relatively rare. 21 Some foundation-funded demonstration programs served as a model for federal legal services funding, but
these programs too involved limited numbers of attorneys. 22 Prior efforts
to reform the law and have a political impact largely were undertaken
by lawyers employed by or associated with organizations, such as the
NAACP and the ACLU, which had meaningful constituent-based organizational controls over attorney actions and activities. For the first generation of OEO Legal Services lawyers, considerably more individual attorney
discretion existed than in other practice settings, especially in policy advocacy matters, to determine on what projects to work, whom to assist, and
how to relate to client groups. Lawyers assisting and representing the poor
were often on their own in figuring out how to exercise professional discretion responsibly in politically charged contexts.
The third background factor of particular relevance for this article is the
continually changing nature of the political environment underlying and
circumscribing social cause lawyering. The specific circumstances in the
late 1960s and early 1970s were unique in our history for using legal advocacy to advance progressive causes. Among the key factors were recent
cultural changes, not universally but widely shared, that challenged conventional traditions and norms; active protest movements over civil rights,
poverty, and the Vietnam War; the coming of age of a generation of lawyers
who had participated in protest movements; and most significantly the
staffing and dispositions of the judiciary
Blowback was not long in coming. It peaked in the 1980s when Ronald
Reagan was president. One early major example was the enactment at his
behest of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981,23 which
was a 600-page bill that among other matters cutback dramatically benefits for families receiving public assistance. OBRA's passage was the first
time the federal budget process had been used in a sweeping manner to
make programmatic legislative changes, and it was a key step in the federal government's retrenchment from supporting progressive New Deal
social welfare legislation. With respect to the provision of legal assistance
for the poor, the Reagan administration in seven of its eight annual appropriation proposals recommended the total defunding of the Legal Services
Corporation, which since 1975 has been the successor agency to OEO
Legal Services. Congress pared back federal funding and began to impose
21. Id. at 5-19; Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the
Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV. 805, 80649 (1967).
22. In the mid-1960s, the Ford Foundation was the leading philanthropic funder supporting demonstration legal services for the poor projects. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at
22-35.
23. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
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significant limitations on the provision of legal services for the poor with
such funds but rejected providing no funding. A conservative backlash is
now again here, in potentially even more devastating ways, with Donald
Trump as president.
Priorities get made, and strategies and tactics get tailored in light of
such changing circumstances. Criticisms of the efficaciousness of past
progressive cause lawyering, especially the use of litigation, are at times
overblown.24 Lawyers involved in those efforts were not oblivious about
the importance of other approaches and co-courses of action.25 The choices
made not infrequently reflected what they regarded as potentially most
advantageous given the limited resources available, the extent of organization and mobilization of affected constituencies, and the then existing
political and legal opportunities and limitations.
Accentuated by the place money plays, our political and legal systems
are not symmetrical in how claims are raised and benefits are dispensed.
Outcomes not surprisingly by and large tilt conservatively in that wellheeled groups usually have their say and get meaningful concessions, not
just specifically but also systemically. It is the unusual reform effort that
disturbs underlying social and economic power relationships. Viewed
structurally, positive changes for non-establishment groups are rarely
other than incremental, which is not to say that they are unimportant.
Because seeking progressive change is always an uphill battle, it is risky
to generalize from specific incidents of group representation. So much
depends on particular conditions and players. Usually, however, three
important functions are involved in social-cause lawyering for marginalized groups. The first concerns influencing and shaping policy making; the
second involves the ongoing need to monitor or police implementation or
enforcement of the policy or practice changes obtained; and the third pertains to the empowerment of those represented, which at its core involves
how lawyers and lay activists working together in specific circumstances
optimize their distinct skills and powers in complementary ways.26 In

24. See Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Local Knowledge inthe History of the Civil Rights
Movement: Review of Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent, 125 HARV. L.REV. 1018 (2012)
(arguing that the thesis-driven nature of such works can result in a failure to fully appreciate the complexity of the circumstances, variability, and impact of litigation strategies
for social change).
25. Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the "Myth of Rights" in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 469, 509 (1999) (concluding, based on sixty-nine semi-structured
interviews with Chicago civil rights and antipoverty lawyers in 1993 and 1994, that the
lawyers "used litigation as part of an arsenal of strategies for securing favorable direct
and indirect benefits for clients").
26. On lawyers working to empower groups, Jennifer Gordon writes, "The real issue
is what kind of lawyers, in what kind of relationships with community groups or movements, using what sorts of strategies, makes sense in which contexts." JENNIFER GORDON,
SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 281 (2006).
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practice, these functions are not independent of one another: they overlap
and when most effective reinforce each other.
In a 2017 article, Scott Cummings provides a thought-provoking and
comprehensive review of the role of lawyers in progressive social change,
primarily since 1970 but also with background information dating back
to the early twentieth century.27 In developing his own ideas, he focuses
on what he calls "movement" lawyering. He uses the term to emphasize
two key features for effective social cause lawyering: "the representation of
a
mobilized clients and the use of integrated advocacy." 2
Cummings defines movement lawyering as "the mobilization of law
through deliberately planned and interconnected advocacy strategies, inside and
outside offormal law-making spaces, by lawyers who are accountable to politically
marginalized constituencies to build the power of those constituencies to produce
and sustain democraticsocial change goals that they define."'29 The definition is a
mouthful. I use it to highlight some similarities and differences that I have
regarding the roles and responsibilities of lawyers in seeking progressive
social change and to place in a contemporary scholarly context my discussion of the Hastings CED Clinic's work with grassroots coalitions and
what I mean by accessibility, responsiveness, and judgment as professional
attributes.
I agree with the importance of viewing the strategies available for affecting social change as multiple and as involving law-related and non-legal
activities. Although the combination of strategies varies in different situations, they need to be highly coordinated when jointly deployed. Litigation
is not always appropriate. When appropriate, it is seldom if ever sufficient
in itself. Support needs to be built through media and grassroots activities.
Furthermore, there is almost always a need for legislative and administrative work, either as a basis for obtaining policy changes or as necessary
follow-up action to promote compliance with law and avoid the erosion
of gains already obtained. Additionally, there are situations where the primary strategy requires transactional legal skills, such as the negotiating
and drafting of a contract.
I also agree with Cummings that the clients set the goals and make the
pivotal decisions. However, to not overly influence client group decisionmaking can be difficult, particularly when one shares the concerns and
goals of the group. For both the lawyer and group members, reasoning
and emotions are at play. In group discussions, there is a premium on lawyer self-awareness about one's own feelings and about the dynamics of
the group." How lawyers tailor what they say or do is significant. Their
27. Scott Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1645.
28. Id. at 1689.
29. Id. at 1690.
30. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-CenterednessMultiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REv. 1103
(1992).
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comments and actions need to be sensitive to their lawyering role as well
as substantively understandable and helpful.
Where I disagree with Cummings is in his presumptions about the
extent of mobilization and organization of marginalized constituencies
and the likelihood of meaningful formal accountability in the absence of a
strong external mechanism, such as a fee. The two matters are tied together.
With a relatively well-organized and well-funded group, for instance a
labor union or federation, attorney accountability is not likely to be much
different from traditional lawyer-client relationships. The lawyers work for
and are paid by the group. When constituencies are inchoate or in early
or quiescent stages of organization or are still in informal and fluid states
of organizational development and have no actual funding, conventional
agency-like accountability is problematic. Differences exist in what attorneys have to do to help such groups realize their objectives and further
their empowerment. In these less-developed organizational circumstances,
even more than in other situations, lawyers need to be highly self-reflective
and self-disciplined in how they interact with client groups and carry out
their professional role responsibilities. From my perspective, much rests on
their abilities to develop and utilize certain inner dispositions, habits, or
mindsets that enhance how they acquire and apply knowledge and their
character as a lawyer.
III. Working in Coalition

A. The Hastings CED Clinic
I begin this article's narrative with brief background information
about the Hastings clinical program and its location on an urban campus
bounded by San Francisco's Civic Center and Tenderloin neighborhood.
The location is ideal for clinical legal education and learning from working
on real cases and projects. It is very near local, state, and federal political
offices and state and federal courts at both the trial and appellate levels.
And it borders one of San Francisco's poorest neighborhoods and all sorts
of unmet needs for quality legal services.
The Tenderloin is a neighborhood with serious drug-dealing and related
criminal problems, a host of concerns regarding social service and healthcare delivery for both housed residents and homeless individuals on the
streets, a continuing need for additional quality affordable housing and
jobs for neighborhood residents, and issues of economic and community
development generally. The Tenderloin is home to families with children
as well as single adults and couples from diverse backgrounds. The largest
groups of residents are Southeast Asian and Latin American immigrants
and refugees.
The typical Tenderloin building is four to six stories high with nonresidential uses on the ground floor and residential units above. Most of
the residential units are studios or one-to-two bedroom apartments or in
Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotels. The non-residential uses are mainly
small commercial establishments, particularly family-owned, ethnic cuisine
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restaurants and neighborhood-serving retail stores. Close to half of the
residential buildings in the heart of the Tenderloin are now owned or
long-term master leased by well-established and responsible nonprofit
organizations. Unlike anywhere else in San Francisco, the likelihood in the
Tenderloin of widespread gentrification and the dislocation of low-income
tenants is very low. The reasons are both the high degree of nonprofit property control and favorable zoning laws that limit the height of buildings.3'
In addition to nonprofit housing organizations, the Tenderloin has
a large number of nonprofit service organizations. Among both types of
organizations are designated community organizers on staff. For those
who reside or work in the Tenderloin, there is much room for improving its
livability. But there also is a significant grassroots organizing infrastructure
for seeking social change.
Toward the end of 1999, several Tenderloin community activists contacted me about having Hastings students, under clinical faculty supervision, assist in a proposed development project that was still in the talking
stage. The community activists knew me because, prior to coming to Hastings in 1992 to start its in-house clinical program, I had worked with a number of Tenderloin grassroots organizations on community development
and homelessness issues.32 After consulting with my clinical colleagues,
our response was to start a Community Economic Development Clinic as
an in-house clinic that would focus on projects affecting the Tenderloin and
its low-income residents, mainly by working with various nonprofit social
service, affordable housing, and community development organizations.
The CED Clinic would undertake non-litigation matters covering operational and programmatic concerns of the different organizations and, in
conjunction with those organizations, policy impact advocacy directed at
improving the quality of life in the Tenderloin. I welcomed the opportunity
to refocus my main teaching and lawyering responsibilities on directing
the CED Clinic.
B. Who Is the Client?
In 2007, through the Clinic's ongoing work in the Tenderloin, I became
aware of a proposed large hospital development on the Tenderloin's western boundary. The project sponsor was California Pacific Medical Center,
the San Francisco affiliate of Sutter Health-a large nonprofit hospital conglomerate in Northern California. The original proposal before the San
Francisco Planning Department not only covered the construction of a new
hospital campus bordering the Tenderloin but also anticipated the closing of St. Luke's Hospital. In large part because of community opposition
31. See RANDY

SHAW, THE TENDERLOIN: SEX, CRIME, AND RESISTANCE IN THE HEART OF

SAN FRANCISCO 188-93, 227-39 (2015).

32. For thirteen years, I was the executive director of the San Francisco Lawyers'
Committee for Urban Affairs, a civil rights and antipoverty legal services organization
now known as the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area.
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to CPMC's plans regarding St. Luke's, CPMC had put on hold its initial
land-use applications. The near-Tenderloin campus, which was referred
to as the Cathedral Hill campus in project documents, was intended to
be a huge hospital facility replacing two other CPMC hospital campuses
located in wealthy San Francisco areas. 4 Unlike St. Luke's, CPMC's other
campuses have a relatively sorry record in serving low-income individuals
and families>' The threatened closure of St. Luke's became a hot button
political issue in San Francisco.
Given the magnitude of CPMC's development proposal, I thought that
it was a project for which it made sense to seek a Community Benefits
Agreement (CBA).36 A CBA is an agreement between a developer and community groups, where the developer agrees to provide a range of community or public benefits beyond what is legally required. The quid pro quo for
the developer is a promise by the community groups to support or at least
not oppose the project. The terms of a CBA are directly enforceable by the
community groups. At the time, CBAs had not been much used as part of
the politics involved in land-use permitting in San Francisco.
Instead, for large and potentially controversial projects, the more
common method for obtaining enforceable but not necessarily statutorily required public or community benefits entailed the negotiation of a
Development Agreement (DA) between the developer and a San Francisco
governmental agency with the bargaining taking place prior to final consideration of a land-use permitting request. With DAs, community groups
may be able to influence the terms and conditions, but they rarely directly
participate in the negotiations or the drafting.

33. San Francisco is a unique local governmental body in California in that it is both
a city and a county, which means that its public policies purview is broader than other
cities. Most relevant for this article, it has not only city but also county public health
responsibilities, which include both operating a public hospital and oversight functions
regarding private hospitals. Structurally, there is a mayor and a board of supervisors
rather than a city council.
34. California law requires hospitals to meet new highly stringent seismic standards.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130050 et seq. To do so, virtually all California acute care
hospitals have to be retrofitted or rebuilt within a statutorily fixed time period.
35. See infra pp. 572-73.
36. Among the matters that I worked on at the Lawyers' Committee was a precursor
to what later would be called a CBA. In the early 1980s, along with pro bono counsel, I
represented the North of Market Planning Coalition (NOMPC), a now defunct organization, in negotiations with three hotel developers who sought to expand or build new
tourist hotel facilities on the Tenderloin side of the Union Square district. The results were
payments by the developers of non-statutorily required cash benefits for low-income
housing and community services. An important follow-up action was NOMPC's successful lobbying for the downzoning of the Tenderloin, which included lowered height
limitations sufficient to discourage both the destruction of existing low-income housing
buildings and the construction of high-rise buildings for higher income residential and
commercial uses. See SHAW, supra note 31, at 181-93.
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For both CBAs and DAs, the objective is to get significant concessions
from the developer, whether a private party or a public entity. When the
target is a private developer, the process is still highly political, as most of
the community group's leverage comes from the private party's interest in
getting a favorable governmental decision. For grassroots organizations,
getting a meaningful CBA or affecting the shaping and writing of a DA
involves effectively influencing public agency decision-making.
After gathering some preliminary information, I contacted a number of
Tenderloin activists about the CPMC project. Knowing how busy they and
their organizations were, I told them that the Clinic would monitor the
planning process and that I would let them know when San Francisco's
review of the project became active and, thus, when it would be timely for
them to decide what, if any, actions to take. For the next two years, two
different paired teams of students spent part of their Clinic time gathering
information about CPMC and the project, healthcare needs and services
in the Tenderloin, applicable land-use requirements, and the nature and
use of CBAs. The students prepared several memoranda and made several informational presentations to Tenderloin social service providers and
activists regarding the project plans and the potential utility of seeking a
CBA. In doing this preliminary work, the students puzzled over who was
the client.
The work being done was in anticipation that the project in some form
would go forward and would be of major concern for Tenderloin residents
and activists. Such engagement reflected both the Clinic's evolving role in
the neighborhood as a resource on community development matters and
a not uncommon reliance on lawyers to be principal monitors of projects
and policies of likely strong interest to a particular constituency The differences in this instance were that the Clinic was not being paid and was not
acting pursuant to any formal retainer agreement. The bond was a shared
commitment with local activists and residents to improving the quality of
life in the Tenderloin. At this stage, to the extent there was a client, it was
the Tenderloin itself.
C. Mobilization and Collaboration
In June 2009, as required by the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA), 7 the San Francisco Planning Department held a scoping hearing for an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) to be prepared for CPMC's
recently revised Long Range Development Plan (LRDP) to restructure and
rebuild its multi-campus presence in San Francisco. The centerpiece was
a new 555-bed hospital abutting the Tenderloin. The size of the hospital
was slightly scaled-down from previous plans. As part of the same hospital campus site, CPMC additionally planned to construct a separate medical office building across the street from the hospital. Because the dividing
street was Van Ness Avenue, a major San Francisco automobile and bus
37.

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE

§ 21000 et seq.
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thoroughfare, the plans further specified the construction of a tunnel to
provide underground passage between the two buildings. In an apparent
concession to past opposition, the revised LRDP also included a rebuilt
but much smaller hospital of 80 beds on the St. Luke's site.38 There were
contingent but not firm plans for constructing a new medical office building adjacent to the rebuilt St. Luke's Hospital. The total estimated LRDP
development and construction costs were $2.2 billion. Following the scoping hearing, I informed Tenderloin community organizers that it was time
to begin organizing if, indeed, sufficient neighborhood interest existed in
responding to the revised proposal before the Planning Commission.
Shortly thereafter, the organizers convened several Tenderloin community meetings providing information about the project. Among the lead
organizers were staff members at Community Housing Partnership (CHP)
and Tenderloin Neighborhood Development Corporation (TNDC), two
highly respected nonprofit affordable housing organization with multiple
properties in the Tenderloin. They invited to these meetings not only Tenderloin activists and residents but also grassroots activists from the Mission
and Bernal Heights neighborhoods adjacent to St. Luke's Hospital, specifically from the Bernal Heights Neighborhood Center, and representatives
from two healthcare worker unions-the California Nurses Association
(CNA) and the National Union of Healthcare Workers (NUHW). The two
unions between them had 1,600 members employed at CPMC campuses
and were engaged in protracted collective bargaining with CPMC's leadership. At the time, CPMC was the second largest non-public employer in
San Francisco with more than 6,000 employees.
Most of the non-Tenderloin participants in these first meetings were
associated with the Coalition for Health Planning-San Francisco and had
been involved for several years in the effort to prevent the closing of St.
Luke's. The first reaction of the citywide healthcare activists was that the
proposed 80-bed hospital on the St. Luke's site would not be economically
sound and would be abandoned within a relatively short period of time
after being built. Rebuilding a hospital that CPMC's leadership did not
want was likely to be a small price to pay to get the land-use entitlements
for the showcase hospital that they did want to build.

38. In response to substantial community opposition following CPMC's proposed
closure of St. Luke's, the San Francisco Public Health Department director and a member of the Board of Supervisors convened a Blue Ribbon Panel to report on the future of
St. Luke's Hospital. The final report listed eleven recommendations, which included the
"building of a new acute care, community hospital on the St. Luke's campus" but of an
unspecified size. Report of the Blue Ribbon Panel on the Future of St. Luke's Hospital
(n.d.), https://www.sfdph.org/dph/hc/HCAgen/HCAgen2009/files405192009/Rpt
BlueRibbonPanelFutureStLukes.pdf. On October 7, 2008, the San Francisco Health Commission endorsed the findings of the Blue Ribbon Panel in Resolution No. 17-08, https://
www.sfdph.org/dph/hc/HCRes/Resolutions/2008Res/HCRes172008.pdf. Neither the
Report nor the Resolution was legally binding on CPMC.
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Also in attendance at these summer meetings was a long-time community activist from the Council of Community Housing Organizations
(CCHO), a San Francisco-focused association of nonprofit affordable
housing development organizations. This particular person had decades
of experience in San Francisco land-use planning politics. Another early
attendee with relevant political experience was from the Chinese Community Development Corporation (CCDC), which had several affordable
housing projects in the Tenderloin, though the organization is primarily
based in San Francisco's Chinatown neighborhood. I too attended these
meetings, as did a student who was enrolled in the CED Clinic for the coming 2009-10 academic year.
As part of the initial organizing effort, the Tenderloin activists conducted a poll of 800 Tenderloin tenants about what they most hoped
would happen as a result of the proposed nearby new hospital. The priority concerns of the polled tenants were access to healthcare services, jobs
for low-income residents, support for additional affordable housing, and
minimizing traffic impacts. By the time the other Clinic students began the
school year in late August, there was within the Tenderloin community a
functioning coalition with which to work and a set of issues around which
to advocate that was grounded in and legitimated by a poll of residents. In
addition, the Tenderloin organizers had forged an alliance with citywide
healthcare advocates and had begun working with a network of affordable
housing groups and two unions. Each of the two unions had continuing
interests in furthering and protecting CPMC worker rights and benefits
and advancing access to quality healthcare across-the-board.
During the school year, the student who voluntarily attended the summer meetings teamed with another student to serve as the Clinic's main
liaisons to the newly organized Tenderloin coalition and its citywide group
allies. Working with employees of the constituent organizations and other
volunteers, the students functioned as an additional staffing resource.
The students participated in group meetings and worked on a variety of
specific research and writing projects involving land use, environmental review, and healthcare delivery issues. A part of their work involved
interacting with lay participants on developing and explaining specific
demands based on both priority issues identified by Tenderloin residents
and related concerns about CPMC raised by other associated groups. Most
of this work was directed at the drafting of a comprehensive policy platform to be used politically, in the media and with policy decision-makers.
The discussions were not just about substantive policy and law. Looking
down the road, these discussions with community and labor organizers
also were firsthand lessons for the students on the centrality of politics,
particularly lobbying for and lining up votes at the Planning Commission
and eventually the Board of Supervisors.
By the end of 2009, the Tenderloin coalition consisted of twenty-three
organizations and had a name-the Good Neighbors Coalition (GNC). The
organizations all endorsed the GNC's positions, but not all were active

Judgment-BasedLawyering: Working in Coalition

participants. Usually six to eight individuals from Tenderloin groups
attended regular meetings, among them staff members from Tenderloin
nonprofit affordable housing organizations and the chief organizer for
the Central City SRO Collaborative-a Tenderloin tenants' organization.
Other active participants were from San Francisco neighborhoods near
the Tenderloin, specifically the Cathedral Hill Neighbors Association
to the west and the South of Market Community Action Network to the
east. Individuals associated with groups that were part of the Coalition
for Health Planning-San Francisco, including labor organizers from CNA
and NUHW, also regularly participated in these weekly or biweekly meetings. In discussions and planning, initial coalition affiliations rarely were
a salient matter. Late in 2010, the chief staff person for Jobs with Justice SF,
a coalition of mostly progressive local labor unions, became another core
union-affiliated participant.
While changes would occur over time in who among the various participants were most active, the lead activists throughout have been highly
sophisticated organizationally and politically Internally, meetings were
run informally, although with an agenda. Preliminary work was often
done in committees, usually organized on an ad hoc basis. In addition,
those attending meetings would enlist, if available and as needed, support
from other staff in their respective constituent organizations. Almost all
final decisions were arrived at by consensus after open discussions and
without taking interminable amounts of time. Externally, the lead participants were very adept at using individual and organizational connections
to get access to San Francisco politicians and administrators. They also
were skillful in using the media and in structuring public events. At various governmental hearings and occasional demonstrations on the steps of
City Hall, they continually relied on members of the different constituent
groups, mainly Tenderloin and other low-income San Francisco residents
and rank-and-file union workers, not only to attend but also to speak about
what was at stake for them. San Francisco's political system is unusually
open and responsive to progressive causes, but not without significant and
visible grassroots support.
A major assignment for Clinic students and faculty in 2010, prior to
the start of the fall term, was to work closely with representatives from
the nonprofit affordable housing community on developing an affordable housing position as part of the GNC policy platform.39 San Francisco
has strong public policies requiring developers of major projects to pay
in lieu fees for affordable housing or to include affordable housing units
within proposed residential developments. CPMC repeatedly claimed that
39. In describing this assignment, I have relied not only on my own notes and observations but also a memorandum dated July 12, 2013, entitled "Report on Final Approved
Development Agreement for the CPMC Project," which was prepared for Council of
Community Housing Organization Members by Calvin Welch, CCHO's Representative
in the Coalition.
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no housing obligation was triggered by its planned construction of new
hospitals, as the sites did not involve displacing residents. CPMC did not
dispute that it had an obligation to provide for the replacement of 25 residential units in buildings to be demolished as part of the development of
the medical office building to be built on the Tenderloin side of Van Ness
Avenue as part of the Cathedral Hill campus. To meet this specific obligation, CPMC agreed relatively early to make an in lieu fee payment. The
eventual amount agreed to was $4,138,620. 40 Regarding anything more,
CPMC vigorously resisted even discussing any other project-related
affordable housing responsibilities. The challenge was to conceptualize a
basis for demanding much more from CPMC given the magnitude and
impact of its proposed project. The backdrop was the crisis in the available
supply of housing in San Francisco, especially for low-income individuals
and families.
Two provisions in the San Francisco Planning Code were most relevant
but had to be linked together in an interpretively novel fashion, which also
invoked Housing Element policies and objectives in San Francisco's General Plan.4 ' The first was the Jobs Housing Linkage Program, which provided formulas for determining in lieu affordable housing fee payments for
different types of major non-residential projects.' The Program's purpose
was to obtain from developers the funds to help meet affordable housing
needs of future end-use employees once a project was built. Within the
Program, how to treat development plans for hospital campuses was not
facially clear. The second was land-use legislation establishing the Van
Ness Special Use District, which encouraged the development of high-rise
residential buildings in the very area where CPMC planned to build its
Cathedral Hill campus.43 CPMC needed an amendment to the use requirements for this District to construct a hospital, which otherwise was not permissible. While this legislation clearly established the construction of new
housing as the highest priority, it was silent regarding the percentage of
affordable housing to be included. A specific committee working on the
GNC's affordable housing position came up with a formula derived from
the amount of housing not being constructed in the Special Use District
as a result of the planned CPMC hospital campus; the high priority commitment to developing affordable housing interwoven throughout the San
Francisco Housing Element; and an in lieu fee amount based on provisions

40. Attorneys with the Chinese Community Development Corporation working with
the Mayor's Office of Housing negotiated this provision, which is noted in the final DA,
as part of a parallel but separate agreement with CPMC. CPMC Development Agreement, supra note 5, Exh. G at 1-2.
41. For an updated version, see 2014 S.F. Housing Element, http://sfplanning.org
/plans-and-programs/planning-for-the-city/housing-element/2014HousingElement
-Part II ADOPTED web.pdf.
42. S.F. PLANNING CODE § 413.
43. Id. § 243.
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for determining the number of affordable housing units required by the
Jobs Housing Linkage Program.
While the formula was far from statutorily straightforward, it made
a credible case for getting a substantial affordable housing contribution
from CPMC far in excess of anything initially anticipated by CPMC or
City administrators. When the affordable housing group first met with
the director of the Mayor's Office of Housing regarding their approach, he
expressed almost no interest, as he viewed the CPMC project as primarily a
healthcare policy issue and not an affordable housing opportunity A meeting in August 2010 with the director of the Planning Department drew a
more positive but still noncommittal response.
To get the attention of CPMC and to further the attention of the Planning Department and other City administrators, the GNC with backing
from its citywide allies proposed a resolution for the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors supporting the housing requirements in existing area plans,
such as the Van Ness Special Use District." A "whereas" provision explicitly referenced as a policy having affordable housing objectives in such
area plans. The "resolved" section set forth as policy "discouraging new
development projects [in specific area plans] that would seek an exception to housing requirements . . . unless that new development project
shall substantially fulfill the underlying housing production goal." In
other words, without mentioning CPMC the resolution highlighted that if
CPMC wanted approval for its hospital campus within the Van Ness Special Use District, the City was going to take seriously potentially applicable
housing requirements, especially for affordable housing. On September 28,
2010, the resolution on a 7-3 vote was adopted by the Board of Supervisors.
Although the resolution was a statement of policy only, not binding law,
it had its intended effect with City administrators. It was not until much
later that the message got across to CPMC. Using the "blended" approach
of applying the housing requirements of the Van Ness Special Use District
and the in lieu affordable housing fee structure of the Jobs Housing Linkage Program, the GNC arrived at a figure of $140 million as an estimated
CPMC affordable housing obligation in addition to all payments due to the
loss of existing housing. Everyone within the group realized that this figure was high, but it was a justifiable place to start. It also was an attentiongetter. After the resolution was passed, the affordable housing committee
members met several times with Planning Department staff, who eventually accepted the group's methodology if not its mathematics. The notion
of a substantial CPMC contribution to affordable housing also came to be
broadly accepted within the Mayor's Office. Obtaining from CPMC a sizeable payment for affordable housing was now on the City's agenda, not
just the agenda of GNC and its allies.
44. S.F. Board of Supervisors Resolution No. 461-10: Resolution Supporting Existing
Area Plan Housing Requirements (Sept. 28, 2010), https://sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles
/bdsupvrs/resolutionsl0/r461-10.pdf.
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For three years beginning with the 2010-11 academic year, all eight students in the CED Clinic worked on the CPMC project. Most of the student
work during this period entailed researching and drafting background
memoranda, factual reports, position papers, and formal filings with
governmental agencies. Two examples are especially noteworthy. Each
involved an entire Clinic cohort working together on a single assignment,
and each had an important impact in advancing community objectives.
The first pertained to the preparation of written comments on the Draft
EIR for CPMC's proposed Long Range Development Plan. The second,
which I describe a bit later, concerned the production and distribution of a
factual report comparing the profitability and charity care performance of
San Francisco hospitals.
The overriding purposes of an EIR are "to provide public agencies and
the public in general with detailed information about the effect that a proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which
the significant effects of such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project."4c An EIR is an informational document
that has to be certified as having adequately discussed the environmental
effects of a covered project before final decisions are made regarding major
land-use entitlements and permit approvals. San Francisco procedures
provide for review, public hearing, and action first at the Planning Commission and then, if there is an appeal, at the Board of Supervisors.46 After
participating in and exhausting all San Francisco internal administrative
procedures, an individual or a group objecting to the certification of an EIR
as inadequate can file a judicial appeal. The EIR process is the single most
important public opportunity for direct community participation in landuse decision-making.
Toward the end of July 2010, a little more than a year after the scoping hearing that triggered the GNC's formation, the Planning Department
released for public comment a Draft EIR for the entire long-range CPMC
project. It was an enormous document involving thousands of pages,
much of the analyses presenting highly technical information. Public comments were noticed as due by October 19. There would be a public hearing
on the Draft EIR, after which the Planning Department would organize
and prepare responses to the comments. The Draft EIR, the comments, and
the responses comprise the Final EIR.47 While one need not be a lawyer
to submit EIR comments, lawyers when available typically draft comment
letters, in effect letter briefs, on behalf of concerned groups. The Good
Neighbors Coalition looked to the Clinic to prepare a comment letter on
the project expressing major grassroots concerns about the project and its
environmental consequences. A new group of Clinic students starting in

45. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061.
46. S.F. ADMIN. CODE §§ 31.14-31.16.
47. Id. § 31.15.

Judgment-BasedLawyering: Working in Coalition

the second half of August had less than two months to get up to speed
about the project overall and about the EIR process.
The most important priority issues for the GNC concerned the social
and economic effects of the project, which are EIR issues only to the extent
they relate to the physical impacts of the project. In drafting the comments,
the Clinic needed to be mindful of how to express credibly GNC concerns
pushing the window but within the framework of EIR law. For example,
healthcare delivery issues were not an easy fit. The EIR itself paid no
attention to matters such as charity care and the accessibility of hospital
services. The new proposed 555-bed CPMC hospital was less than a halfmile from another private hospital owned by a different nonprofit hospital
chain, which had a far better record in providing charity care than CPMC.
The argument made was that the EIR needed to analyze whether the new
hospital posed a competitive threat to the existing hospital that could lead
to the latter's closure and, as a result, blighted conditions at the abandoned
former hospital site. There was case precedent for such an environmental
argument.48 The main purpose of the argument, however, was to underscore for decision-makers the importance of taking into account, when
deciding whether to permit construction of the new hospital as proposed,
the impact on the accessibility of in-patient care for poor individuals and
families.
With a lot of hard work and hours spent, including many group sessions, the Clinic in mid-October submitted on behalf of the GNC, and after
review by its members, a thirty-eight-page comment letter on a range of
issues. The specific topics addressed were affordable housing, transportation and circulation, air quality and greenhouse emissions, local firstsource hiring, healthcare delivery, and an analysis of project alternatives.
As part of a coordinated effort, several other comment letters were submitted by organizations associated with the GNC but in their own names. The
most substantial other comment letters were prepared by separate private
law firms for, respectively, the California Nurses Association and several
nonprofit affordable housing organizations. Those letters included and
largely reflected the findings and opinions of environmental consultants,
the most typical approach taken in serious EIR comment letters. Knowing
what allied organizations were likely to say gave the Clinic room to prepare a comment letter that could focus heavily on the social and economic
effects of the project without getting bogged down into too many technical
details. The GNC's comment letter immediately helped solidify its position as a major player in the review of the CPMC project by San Francisco
public officials.
It would be another twenty-one months before the GNC comment letter, in a hearing before the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, would have
its most important impact on the CPMC EIR process. In the interim, there
48. See Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, 124 Cal. App. 4th 1184
(2004).
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were numerous private meetings and public hearings involving various
San Francisco officials at the Planning Department and Planning Commission, at the Public Health Department and Health Commission, in the
Mayor's Office, and with the Board of Supervisors. In early 2011, two notable developments occurred that significantly affected the future course of
events.
The first took place in February and early March and involved three
meetings with CPMC that included both participants associated with the
GNC and mayoral representatives. Although the hope was that productive
negotiations would take place, CPMC had no interest at the time in making any concessions that would address community concerns. One clear
indication was the absence at the table of anyone from CPMC's decisionmaking leadership. Another was an ad hominem attack during the discussions by a CPMC publicist directed at CED Clinic students who had
attended the meeting as observers. The sessions were not fruitful.
The second notable development originated immediately after the frustrating and futile negotiations with CPMC. It began with a meeting on
March 15, 2011, attended by GNC members and allies and Mayor Ed Lee,
newly in office as the interim successor to Gavin Newsom, who had been
elected California's Lieutenant Governor. The GNC had sent a copy of its
platform to Mayor Lee the week before. At the meeting, he listened attentively. Two months later on May 17 was a second meeting with the Mayor
to review and discuss a draft of the City's proposed position regarding
the CPMC project. On May 20, Mayor Lee announced publically the City's
position and sent to CPMC "A Request... for Community Benefits" which,
in exchange for San Francisco's approving CPMC's project proposal without any changes in the building plans, spelled out various terms for a proposed Development Agreement. Though not as extensive, the benefits and
conditions proposed were in line with those found in the Coalition's platform. One prominent provision in the Mayor's proposal was a request for
$73 million as an in lieu affordable housing payment in accordance with
the requirements of the Van Ness Special Use District. This amount was
a little more than half the amount put forward by the GNC eight months
before but, nevertheless, a striking change in position by the City's executive branch. At a press conference in early June, CPMC slammed Mayor
Lee's proposal as "fiscally impossible."
Two weeks later, CPMC's chief executive announced that CPMC did
not believe that continuing negotiations with the GNC was the best way
to proceed. In previous GNC discussions, some tactical disagreement had
arisen about whether to seek a CBA or a DA to structure and enforce the
terms and conditions of any eventually reached agreement. The GNC platform could serve as a community-benefits agenda for either type of agreement. Instead of choosing one or the other, the decision was to leave open
both prospects and to determine down the line, depending upon evolving circumstances, which type of negotiated agreement to get behind. In
light of CPMC's lack of good faith in the negotiation sessions and negative
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public comment afterwards, though not giving up on the idea totally, no
one within the GNC was optimistic about the likelihood of a CBA eventually being reached. If there were to be any meaningful concessions from
CPMC, the more likely vehicle would be through a DA.
In early July, CPMC made a counteroffer to the Mayor's "Request"
regarding various community benefits at levels significantly less than he
had proposed and substantially less than the GNC proposals. A month later,
Mayor Lee turned his attention elsewhere as he decided to seek election as
Mayor, something he had foresworn when appointed Interim Mayor. Officials within his administration, however, continued backroom discussions
with CPMC. The City's lead representative was from the Mayor's Office
of Economic and Workforce Development. Individuals associated with the
GNC and allied groups were not directly or indirectly involved in these
discussions. Nothing became public about even the general nature of these
discussions until the end of the year after the voters in early November
elected Mayor Lee for a full term.
At the beginning of the 2011 fall term, it was not clear what might be the
major CPMC project assignment for the CED Clinic students. The Final EIR
on the hospital rebuild was still in preparation at the Planning Department,
which meant no further official actions on the project for some time. GNC
members and allies were meeting regularly and were involved in various
efforts directed at informing public officials and the public about the project and GNC's positions. A major undertaking during the late summer and
early fall was the production and citywide distribution of 10,000 tabloid
newspapers outlining those positions. Specially targeted were Board of
Supervisor districts with upcoming election races in 2012.
With respect to new Clinic work, one area for factual research was the
gathering and organizing of comparative information and data about the
charitable activities and financial positions of San Francisco hospitals, which
is not an easy task because of differences in organizational structure and mission. San Francisco, like other localities, has experienced a major reduction
in the number of independent acute care hospitals from closures and consolidations. The City has two relatively large nonprofit fee-for-service hospital groups, each with multiple campuses. The largest is CPMC, which at
the time of the research had four campuses.49 The other is Dignity Health,
which has two campuses-Saint Francis and St. Mary's Hospitals. There is
also a small nonprofit fee-for-service hospital serving the Chinatown neighborhood. Two other major fee-for-service hospitals are publicly supportedSan Francisco General Hospital and the UCSF Medical Center, which now
has two hospital campuses. There also is a federal Veterans' Hospital. The
only other San Francisco acute-care hospital is part of Kaiser Permanente, a
49. They were St. Luke's in the low-income but gentrifying Mission District; the
Davies Campus in the Dubose Triangle, an already gentrified middle income neighborhood; the Pacific Campus in the wealthy Pacific Heights area; and the California Campus
in the almost as tony Laurel Heights area.
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nonprofit membership-based healthcare provider serving a large number of
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) enrollees.
The students paired off in teams of two. Their initial research and drafting revealed that two students had unexpected and especially helpful
skills. One was very comfortable in using computer software to produce
highly polished reports with charts, tables, graphs, and photographs. The
other, who prior to law school worked at an investment bank, was very
skillful in identifying and analyzing online hospital financial and patient
data collected by the State of California. After consulting with GNC participants, we decided to produce a report that would be professional in
appearance and printed in color for use in advocacy efforts. The tone of
the report would be objective, which meant just reporting the facts, not
drawing the logical argumentative conclusions. The latter would be left to
the reader. In working together on the drafting, one student in particular
had a hard time not making explicit advocacy arguments as part of the
text. The students got firsthand experience in the importance of tailoring
language for different purposes and for different audiences, all in an effort
to advance the objectives of a client group. Like the EIR comments, this
assignment involved an enormous individual and group effort.
In early December 2011, the Clinic held a press conference at the Clinic's
office to announce publication of the report entitled Profits & Patients:The
FinancialStrength and CharitableContributionsof San FranciscoHospitals." The
report's lead student editor was the Clinic's spokesperson and presided
over the press conference, which was attended by a number of reporters
including a reporter and photographer from the San FranciscoChronicle,the
Bay Area's main daily newspaper. The next day the Chronicle published a
front-page story in the Bay Area section, which included a photograph of
the student with a blown-up chart from the report behind him."
The report's facts clearly showed that CPMC was exceptionally profitable even when including St. Luke's Hospital, which operated at a loss, and
that the CPMC campuses other than St. Luke's had an abysmal charity care
record. For fiscal years 2006-2010, CPMC's average annual net income was
$149 million. As a comparison, Dignity Health's hospitals struggled during
this period. Saint Francis had average annual losses of $3 million, while St.
Mary's average annual net income was $4.5 million. The picture was quite
the opposite with respect to amounts attributed to charity care. Charity
care covers a number of matters, but the largest component is a write-off of
the shortfall in governmental reimbursements, based on supposed market
rates, for services provided patients covered by Medi-Cal (Medicaid)-the
federal and state health insurance program for poor and other low-income
individuals and families. In fiscal year 2010, St. Luke's ratio of charity care
to net patient revenue was 3.77 percent, while the three CPMC campuses
50. Copy on file with author.
51. Victoria Colliver, S.F. Hospitals: CPMC Spends Far Less on Poor Report Says, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 9, 2011, at Cl, C9.
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in wealthier San Francisco areas reported a joint charity care to net patient
revenue ratio of 1.14%. For Saint Francis and St. Mary's the ratios that
same year were, respectively 4.43% and 2.95%. In 2004, the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors in a nonbinding resolution had called upon CPMC to
increase the delivery of charity care at its campuses, which at the time did
not include St. Luke's, to 3% of net patient revenue?. 2 Despite unrivaled
financial success during the years since 2004, the three CPMC campuses in
wealthier San Francisco areas were far from doing their fair share in serving Medi-Cal and low-income patients generally. St. Luke's was the exception, and CPMC's initial position was to close the entire facility.
The GNC distributed copies of the report to the Mayor and members
of his staff, members of the Planning and Health Commissions, and staff
and members of the Board of Supervisors. It also was distributed to additional media representatives. The report became an important part of the
campaign to rebuild St. Luke's Hospital at a size that would further its
permanent sustainability and to increase overall CPMC's charity-care commitments and other community benefit contributions along the lines set
forth in the GNC platform. CPMC's public response to the report was an
attempt to discredit it by asserting that it was prepared by law students
working with groups opposed to its development plans. CPMC never disputed any of the report's findings.
The publication of the report was timed to come out immediately before
a Board of Supervisors Committee of the Whole Hearing on the CPMC
project, which occurred on December 13, 2011. The hearing was convened
by several supervisors, including the Board President, at the request of the
GNC and its allies. It was not a common proceeding. GNC participants
prepared briefing papers for the supervisors and met with a number of
them ahead of time. The objectives were to educate the supervisors about
the project and to get information about the status and general terms of the
negotiations taking place between City administrators and CPMC.
The hearing began with presentations from City officials in the Mayor's
Office of Economic and Workforce Development, the Planning Department, the Department of Public Health, and the Mayor's Office of Housing. Board of Supervisor members then questioned the City administrators.
While not all specifics were presented, the topics covered a full range of
project concerns, including charity care and Medi-Cal patient commitments, keeping a rebuilt St. Luke's Hospital open long-term, maintaining
hospital-based Skilled Nursing Facilities, affordable housing needs, permanent entry level jobs for low-income San Francisco residents, and transportation, traffic, and streetscape issues mainly related to the large, showcase
hospital proposed for the new Cathedral Hill campus. Opportunities for
community group participation also came up with one Board member
52. S.F. Board of Supervisors Res. No. 318-04: Resolution Opposing Discriminatory
Pricing Practices and Aggressive Debt Collection at Sutter Health Hospitals (May 8,
2004), https: //sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/resolutions04/rO328-04.pdf.
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specifically asking about having a CBA, not only a DA. Board members
were well aware of CPMC's hostility to grassroots coalition involvement.
After the back-and-forth between City administrators and Board members, community participants as part of a GNC group presentation were
allotted time to raise both specific substantive and general institutional
concerns about the project and the negotiations. The GNC speakers were
primarily a mix of neighborhood group and hospital labor-union representatives. The first speaker, however, was a CED Clinic law student who
underscored and responded to a Board member's question about CPMC's
poor charity care record and notably high net revenue. The Clinic's Profits
& Patients report was a crucial piece in the effort to get Board members to
view skeptically CPMC's representations about the structuring and effects
of the multicampus hospital's Long Range Development Plan and its good
faith in negotiating DA terms.
In March 2012, the Tenderloin organizers of the Good Neighbors Coalition and citywide activists initially associated with the Coalition for Health
Planning-San Francisco and Jobs with Justice SF explicitly acknowledged
that they, in effect, had been operating as a coalition of coalitions. Since the
initial organizing in summer 2009, neighborhood groups and labor unions
to an unusual degree had planned and acted together in challenging
CPMC's hospital rebuilding plans not to stop the project but to advocate
for a much more equitable and publically beneficial project than otherwise
was likely to be the case. Along with environmental matters, the primary
substantive concerns involved healthcare, housing, and jobs issues. The
organizers and activists chose San Franciscans for Healthcare, Housing,
Jobs, and Justice (SFHHJJ or H2J2) as the new umbrella name and identity
for their collective and joint advocacy efforts going forward. With now a
citywide and not primarily a Tenderloin coalition as its client, the Hastings
CED Clinic continued to provide legal assistance and representation.
Ironically that same month, Mayor Lee and CPMC announced that they
had reached agreement on a DA. Although elected as a "can do" candidate
the previous November, the mayor and his administration in early 2012
suffered two high-profile development losses not connected to the CPMC
project. One consequence politically was that he was under considerable
pressure to get a CPMC deal done.
The terms of this DA were significantly less costly and stringent for
CPMC than those contained in Mayor Lee's May 2011 "Request." One
example was that the $73 million initially requested by the Mayor for
affordable housing was reduced to $58 million with half to be used for a
"home ownership" program exclusively for CPMC employees (probably
mostly for doctors and other professionals). This decrease meant that only
$29 million would be available for affordable-housing purposes generally
Another example was a minimal local hire commitment for end-use jobs
with CPMC. The goal was forty entry-level jobs annually for a five-year
period. As a comparison, the City's policy for construction jobs on targeted projects set a local-hire goal of fifty percent. A third example was
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a provision that contained a complex formula allowing CPMC to close
a rebuilt St. Luke's Hospital in less than twenty years if it lost money
The Mayor's representatives claimed that there was virtually no risk at
all that this formula would result in allowing CPMC to shut St. Luke's
within twenty years-a troubling too-soon time period in its own right.
A fourth example, one of particular concern to fiscal-minded supervisors
allied with the Mayor, was the absence of any requirement that CPMC cap
healthcare costs that affected group health insurance premiums paid by
the City for its employees. The proposed DA also did not contemplate a
change in the sizes of the two hospitals to be constructed. The plans still
called for a 555-bed hospital near the Tenderloin and an 80-bed replacement hospital on the St. Luke's site.
In early April, the Mayor sent the proposed DA to the Board of Supervisors. He did so before including it in the package of material to be considered by the Planning Commission as part of its environmental and
permitting review of the CPMC project. A year and a half after comments
had been submitted, the Planning Department at last had completed the
Final EIR, which needed to be certified as adequate prior to consideration of the various land-use permitting applications and accompanying
requests for necessary zoning legislative changes. Significantly, no member
of the Board of Supervisors indicated support for the DA. Nonetheless, the
Mayor's Office pushed for full Planning Commission review of the CPMC
project.
The CED Clinic on behalf of SFHHJJ and a private law office on behalf
of the California Nurses Association (CNA) submitted written objections
to certification of the Final EIR. The procedures established for the EIR
process continued to provide the best opportunity for objecting to a major
land-use project. At the Planning Commission hearing on April 26, SFHHJJ
representatives and members of its constituent organizations expressed
opposition to the Final EIR and the CPMC project. The objections focused
on such issues as increased traffic, worsening air quality, insufficient affordable housing, and unsuitable sizes of the two hospitals-a too big Cathedral Hill hospital and a too small St. Luke's replacement hospital. CPMC
rallied support on its behalf, including from construction trade union leaders and members. The main arguments in support emphasized the creation
of 1,500 construction jobs and 1,500 new permanent jobs. The contentious
hearing lasted ten hours. On a 5-1 vote, the Planning Commission certified
the Final EIR, approved the permitting applications and zoning changes,
and recommended that the Board of Supervisors support the DA terms.3
In mid-May, SFHHJJ and CNA appealed the Planning Commission's
decision on the Final EIR to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors,
the effect of which was to stop the process regarding all administrative
approvals and legislative changes until the full Board of Supervisors held
53. Stephanie M. Lee, Medical Center Plan for 5 Sites Gets OK, S.F.
2012, at C3.

CHRON.,

Apr. 27,
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its own EIR hearing and decided whether to uphold the appeal or affirm
the Planning Commission's Final EIR certification. 4 Originally scheduled
for June 12, the full Board of Supervisors hearing on the CPMC Final EIR
was continued until July 17.
In the interim, at the request of SFHHJJ, the Chair of the Board of Supervisors Land Use Committee convened four Committee hearings on various aspects of the proposed DA. 5 The first two hearings on June 15 and
25 were fairly routine. In early July, the San Francisco Chronicle reported
that an anonymous whistleblower within CPMC had documents that indicated CPMC, under the formula included in the DA, could actually close
St. Luke's in less than four years after its opening, not twenty years as previously claimed by CPMC and the Mayor. 6 The St. Luke's issue dominated
the third Land Use Committee hearing on July 9. At the hearing, CPMC
representatives refused to share with Board of Supervisors members the
data it used to determine when it would be able to close St. Luke's under
the DA formula. The Mayor's representative at the hearing stated that his
marching orders were to get a guarantee on St. Luke's remaining open for
a minimum of twenty years. It made no difference: CPMC still refused to
budge. 7 Issues also were raised at the hearing about the amount of charity
care required under the DA, the provisions for permanent local jobs, and
the potential effects on public and private healthcare costs if CPMC were
not constrained from using its dominance in the San Francisco private feefor-service hospital market to obtain increased fee reimbursements from
insurance companies, thereby driving up health insurance premiums. At
the last Committee hearing on July 16 attended by seven Board members,
the main focus was on affordable housing and transportation issues not
sufficiently addressed in either the DA or the Final EIR.
By the time the Final EIR appeal was heard on July 17, considerable
skepticism arose within the eleven-member Board of Supervisors about
the benefits for San Francisco of the overall project as then structured and
spelled out in the DA negotiated by the Mayor's Office. While the focus
of the hearing was on the adequacy of the Final EIR, it was the merits and
downsides of the underlying project that were of most concern. In preparing for the hearing, the CED Clinic and SFHHJJ leaders worked together
in drafting backup material for sympathetic supervisors that highlighted

54. In preparing the appeal notice and supportive arguments, I enlisted the help of a
graduating Hastings student who had taken the CED Clinic the year before. Prior to law
school, she had worked for an environmental consulting firm. In preparing the Clinic's
original comments on the Draft EIR, she had been an enormous help in editing with me
into a cohesive whole the various sections prepared by different student teams. We coordinated our written appeal with CNA's appeal.
55. See CPMC Development Agreement, supra note 5, at 4.
56. John Cote, Leaked Papers Put City-Hospital Deal in Jeopardy, S.F. CHRON., July 3,
2012, at Al.
57. John Cote, Mayor,Hospital Refusing to Budge, S.F. CHRON., July 10, 2012, at Al.
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significant legal flaws in the Final EIR and proposed specific lines of questioning. The main points covered transportation and traffic issues, the
adverse impact on San Francisco's housing policies, the need for a smaller
Cathedral Hill hospital and a larger St. Luke's hospital, and the rejection
of environmentally superior alternatives. The full Board hearing began at
almost 6:00 p.m. and ended just before midnight. Both CPMC and SFHHJJ
supporters were present in sizeable numbers.
Legally, CPMC was represented throughout the land-use proceedings,
including at the full Board of Supervisors hearing, by a law firm known
for the high quality of its legal work and its political connections. At most
proceedings, three or four attorneys from the firm were present, often
including one of the firm's named partners, a much respected Bay Area
land-use lawyer. At public proceedings, the San Francisco City Attorney's
Office rarely played a visible role, leaving descriptions and explanations
regarding the project and the City's position to administrative personnel
from the Mayor's Office, the Planning Department, and the Public Health
Department. While at most public hearings CED Clinic comments were
integrated as part of coordinated testimony from SFHHJJ leaders and constituents, the EIR appeal was a formal administrative proceeding where
attorneys when available usually assume a lead role.
In Final EIR administrative appeals, the hearing begins with presentations from and questioning of the appellant representatives. The plan was
for the CNA attorney to be the primary lawyer speaking in support of the
Final EIR appeal. I would provide backup support." Dating back to the
preparation of Draft EIR comments, we had an open and cooperative relationship. As it turned out, when questions came up from members of the
Board of Supervisors, the CNA lawyer motioned for me to respond. While
she was an experienced environmental law attorney, I had greater familiarity with the project specifics and the political context and dynamics. She
had been hired for her technical knowledge and apparently recognized
that my having worked closely with SFHHJJ participants for almost three
years would be a definite advantage in shaping what to say and represent.
Following their questioning of me, the Board members heard comments
from the public in support of the appeal.
The lead environmental officer on the project from the City Planning
Department then presented the case for affirming the certification of the Final
EIR. She was questioned by six supervisors, most critically by three supervisors with whom SFHHJJ representatives had met ahead of time. Only one
supervisor in his questioning appeared supportive of the Final EIR.
Next to speak were representatives of the project sponsor. After a brief
statement from CPMC's chief executive, the general counsel associated
58. For almost two years in the early 1990s before assuming my professorship at
Hastings, I had worked at an environmental law firm, so I had relevant prior legal experience responding to EIRs. Because it was mid-summer, no Clinic students were available
to assist in the Board of Supervisors hearing.
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with Sutter Health, its corporate parent, stepped in to indicate a willingness to continue the proceeding for two weeks during which, in his scenario, there would be further discussions with the Mayor's Office. The idea
of a two-week continuance was left hanging in the air. Instead, one of the
supervisors questioned him about the early closing of a rebuilt St. Luke's
Hospital and pressed for full disclosure of relevant CPMC financial data.
The hospital's in-house attorney avoided definitively answering and sat
down. Outside counsel for CPMC then provided a brief history of the project and offered arguments against various comments in opposition to certifying the Final EIR. His presentation was followed by public testimony in
support of the CPMC project.
The public hearing was closed at 11:20 p.m., after which individual
supervisors expressed their views regarding the adequacy of the Final
EIR. Seven of the eleven supervisors clearly indicated that they would not
support its certification. A number of them specifically referred to issues
initially raised in the CED Clinic's Draft EIR letter brief. The supervisors
additionally indicated that they wanted to see further dialogue with community groups about the project and a reworked Development Agreement.
At the end of the hearing, there was a voting compromise: a motion for a
two-week continuance passed without objection. Suggested by the general
counsel for CPMC's corporate parent as a short-term, face-saving measure,
the two-week continuance wound up being almost a year. It would not be
until June 25, 2013, that the Final EIR would come back before the Board
of Supervisors for a final vote. In the interim, there would be a serious
reworking of the Development Agreement-this time with the working
agenda largely set by SFHHJJ. CPMC and Sutter Health had underappreciated and continued to underappreciate SFHHJJ's political wherewithal,
most especially the local government experience and contacts of its affordable housing and labor union members.
In August and September 2012, SFHHJJ members devised a plan for
restarting negotiation discussions with CPMC. The objectives were to
maximize the Board of Supervisors support for SFHHJJ's positions on
affordable housing; transit, traffic, and neighborhood impacts; permanent
workforce hiring and retention; healthcare access; and the proposed respective sizes of the Cathedral Hill and St. Luke's hospitals. Another objective
not explicitly linked was to call attention to the separate collective bargaining negotiations pending between CPMC and both the California Nurses
Association and the National Union of Healthcare Workers, each being an
important SFHHJJ participant.
Because of federal preemption under the National Labor Relations Act,
City officials cannot interfere in a private party labor dispute by withholding or appearing to withhold a governmental benefit. 9 There would be no
discussion of management and union bargaining issues as part of negotiating a revised Development Agreement. All interested parties, however,
59. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
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were well aware that the three separate but parallel negotiations would be
happening at roughly the same time, with CPMC and Sutter Health management as a common, central player.
Tactically, the SFHHJJ's approach to renegotiating the DA involved a
restructuring of who would be present at the negotiations. Rather than
pressing for direct CBA negotiations given CPMC's continuing intransigence and hostility, SFHHJJ came up with three complementary ideas for
restarting Development Agreement discussions.
The first was to have Board members, not the Mayor's Office, take the
lead in representing the City SFHHJJ members contacted first the two
supervisors who were most active in questioning the adequacy of the
Final EIR-David Chiu, who was the Board president and seen as a centrist within San Francisco's Board politics, and David Campos, who was
part of its progressive wing. They both agreed and suggested that Supervisor Mark Farrell, who was seen as a moderate on the Board, join them
as a negotiating team for the City.60 Not having had much support from
the Board of Supervisors regarding the DA put forward by his office, the
Mayor expressed no public opposition to Board members taking over the
lead for the City in future negotiations. Top officials within the administration would continue to provide staff support as would lawyers within the
City Attorney's Office.
The second idea was to encourage the supervisors to request representatives from Sutter Health to participate directly in the negotiations. The
leaders of CPMC, its subsidiary, appeared to be attached to building a
large showcase hospital and not much else and had shown themselves to
be largely tone-deaf politically. Sutter Health was increasingly centralizing
major decision-making within its hospital system, so Sutter Health leaders,
not local CPMC executives, would likely make final decisions.
The third idea was to bring in a prominent private citizen as a mediator. One of the union representatives within the SFHHJJ coalition had a
specific person in mind, who had previously played a role in past collective bargaining disputes with CPMC. Widely known politically in San
Francisco, the individual proposed was a lawyer and business owner, an
experienced mediator, a former City commission member, and a CPMC
Foundation donor and social friend of top CPMC executives. He also was
a pro-union employer and a donor to various nonprofit Tenderloin organizations. The supervisors agreed with SFHHJJ's proposal to have a mediator and to ask the SFHHJJ-identified candidate to fill that role as a public
service and without financial compensation. CPMC and Sutter Health
executives at first were reluctant to having him as the mediator but then
reversed course and acceded. Advocating in the background, SFHHJJ was
60. Farrell later became San Francisco's Interim Mayor for the first half of 2018 after
the sudden death of Mayor Ed Lee in late December 2017. "Moderate" in San Francisco is
usually a term for a more business-friendly public official, who, on the national political
spectrum, probably would be viewed as a moderate liberal.

580

Journalof Affordable Housing

Volume 2 7, Number 3

2019

able to reconfigure who would be the key participants in putting the DA
negotiations back on track.
In late September 2012, SFHHJJ members met with the mediator to lay
out the Coalition's framework of issues. He agreed to consider the issues
presented as the outline for the mediation. He emphasized that the key
was getting Sutter Health to send the right people. In early October, the
mediation group had its first meeting. Over the next five months, the
group had a series of meetings, some productive and some frustrating. Sutter Health had its own executives, not just CPMC's, participate in the discussions. In several in-person meetings at his business office, the mediator
discreetly provided SFHHJJ members with updates about the negotiations
and got their reactions to certain proposals. Throughout, SFHHJJ provided
information, usually upon request, to the negotiating supervisors and their
staff.
On March 5, 2013, the Mayor announced the major terms of a new proposed DA reached as a result of the mediated negotiations.6 ' Also that day,
the National Union of Healthcare Workers signed a collective bargaining agreement with CPMC that provided a two percent retroactive wage
increase, a ban on subcontracting, job security at the new Cathedral Hill
campus, and full employer-paid health insurance.62 A week later, the Board
of Supervisors unanimously approved a nonbinding resolution endorsing
the Term Sheet to be used in the final drafting of a second proposed Development Agreement. 61 Though SFHHJJ had a few additional concerns, none
of its members publically objected to the Board's action. On March 27,
CNA reached a new contract for 800 nurses at CPMC hospitals, which gave
them seniority rights and a six-percent wage increase over the twentyfour-month length of the contract.' It had been a busy month.
D. The Development Agreement's Terms
Substantively, the terms of the new Development Agreement provided
most of the changes and community benefits sought by SFHHJJ, though
some with conditions or in reduced compromise amounts. The most striking changes were the in-patient capacities of the proposed two new hospitals and the commitment to maintaining a hospital on the St. Luke's
campus. The showcase hospital planned for the Cathedral Hill campus
was reduced in size from 555 beds to 274 beds, with shell space available
to be developed for 30 additional beds depending upon future patient census data and state licensing authorization.' This almost in-half reduction
meant a significant lessening in long-term adverse environmental effects61. SFHHJJ, Chronology of a Successful Community/Labor Coalition: The Battle
over Rebuilding CPMC the Right Way (2013).
62. Id.
63. CPMC Development Agreement, supra note 5, at 4.
64. SFHHJJ Chronology, supra note 61.
65. CPMC Development Agreement, supra note 5, Exh. B-2 at 1.
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for instance, traffic and transportation impacts. With respect to St. Luke's
Hospital, the plans included in the DA called for the construction of a 120bed rather than 80-bed hospital.66 This increase in size by fifty percent furthered the likely economic viability of the new hospital.67 The new DA also
contained no provisions allowing CPMC to close the St. Luke's replacement hospital within a short time frame, and it further provided that the
construction and opening of the new hospital on the St. Luke's campus had
to be synchronized with the construction and completion of the Cathedral
Hill hospital.68
Regarding purely financial obligations, CPMC as a hospital was not
able to hide behind its nonprofit, tax-exempt status as a public charity. The
$74 million in cash benefits set forth in the Development Agreement, and
summarized at the beginning of this article, was an unprecedented amount
for this type of project.69 In working out the details of the payments, an
additional wrinkle arose for some of the funding allocations. Specifically
the DA contained provisions that enlisted the San Francisco Foundation, a
well-respected local community foundation, in decision-making concerning the distribution of $8.6 million in innovative healthcare funding and
of $4 million in workforce training money.7 A relatively late addition to
the final benefits package was a specific commitment of $4.45 million for
Tenderloin streetscape and pedestrian safety improvements-a
matter of
71
special concern to Tenderloin activists within SFHHJJ.
With respect to the magnitude of the monetary payments overall,
the most remarkable development was $36.5 million for affordable lowincome housing as a mitigation measure for removing land zoned for
housing within the Van Ness Special Use District. 72 This amount was in
addition to the $4,138,620 triggered by ordinances covering the displacement of residents from existing buildings to be demolished to make way
for the proposed Cathedral Hill Medical Office Building.73 Given the
almost one-half reduction in the number of licensed hospital beds planned
for the Cathedral Hill campus, $36.5 million proportionately was in line
with the $73 million figure first put forward by Mayor Lee in May 2011 as
66. Id., Exh. B-1 at 1.
67. In agreeing to these changes, CPMC may have had long-term business interests
in mind. Neighborhoods proximate to the St. Luke's campus were gentrifying. There also
is a strong trend in medical care toward less hospitalization that might well have been
a factor in support of CPMC's decision to agree to a much reduced in size Cathedral
Hill hospital. Even so, I am doubtful that CPMC would have made such changes in the
absence of SFHHJJ's advocacy and the negotiations carried out by S.F. Board of Supervisors members with the help of the selected mediator.
68. CPMC Development Agreement, supra note 5, Exh. C.
69. Id. at 3 & Exh. G at 1.
70. Id., Exh. F at 9-12 & Exh. E at 19.

71. Id., Exh. H at 2 & 4.
72. Id., Exh. G at 2.
73. Id., Exh. G at 1-2.
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a response to SFHHJJ's initial $140 million calculation, and in anticipation
of CPMC's then adamant view that it owed nothing. Seen in this light and
the earlier lack of interest from City administrators in seeking any such
funds at all, the unconditioned commitment by CPMC of $36.5 million for
non-specified low-income affordable housing was an impressive turn of
events.
There were several other noteworthy substantive provisions. One
significant change affected CPMC's permanent hiring practices. Earlier,
CPMC had indicated that it would give first-priority to hiring individuals
from San Francisco low-income neighborhoods for forty positions annually for five years. The DA set the commitment as at least forty percent
of all available entry level jobs for a ten-year period."4 Other provisions
concerned commitments to providing healthcare and hospital services
for low-income individuals and families. An especially important CPMC
obligation pertained to meeting an annual unduplicated patient baseline for providing services to Medi-Cal and charity care beneficiaries."
Another involved targeting hospital and specialty care services at CPMC
campuses for 1,500 Tenderloin residents on Medi-Cal. 76 In another subject area, augmenting the mitigation measures included in the Final EIR,
the DA specifically obligated CPMC to subsidize public-transit monthly
passes for employees to reduce traffic, pollution, and greenhouse gas
production. 77 These provisions were performance-based. They involved
more than just writing a check, and they required ongoing, diligent
monitoring.
Having obtained much of what it wanted substantively, SFHHJJ still
had several procedural concerns. Starting in April and until a week before
the Board of Supervisors on June 25 took definitive action on the CPMC
project, SFHHJJ sought two changes regarding the DA's implementation.
The first concerned obtaining a guarantee from the City that it would provide for a specific role for SFHHJJ in monitoring developments under the
DA. The second concerned the public review process if any future amendments occurred to the DA, altering its terms.
With respect to the first, the San Francisco ordinance authorizing Development Agreements anticipated participation by community groups in
carrying out DA provisions. Such participation could be provided through
a "collateral agreement" between the community group and any one of
the parties to the DA either at the time of the DA or at a later time. 7 The
stated purpose for having collateral agreements was to permit the use of
community groups to "provide for and implement social, economic, or

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id., Exh. E at 16.
Id., Exh. F at 1-4.
Id., Exh. F at 8.
Id. at 3 & Exh. K at 5.

78. S.F. ADMIN.

CODE

§§ 56.2, 56.3(c), 56.11.
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environmental benefits or programs" set forth in the DA.79 Giving a formal
monitoring role to a community coalition was a novel but not unsupportable interpretation if one liberally construed the meaning of "benefits or
programs" and took into account the ordinance's strong language regarding community group participation. SFHHJJ's main concern was the potential for problematic implementation of nonmonetary provisions of the DA,
such as those covering commitments regarding charity care and healthcare
services, transportation and traffic mitigations, and permanent jobs for San
Francisco residents. It was felt that a formal role for SFHHJJ in gathering
and assembling information on certain key matters, not just as an outside
advocate, would provide additional community leverage and better insure
that both CPMC and the City would live up to the DA's terms.
City administrators and the City Attorney's Office were adamant in
their opposition to having the City in any way entering into a collateral
agreement with SFHHJJ regarding the CPMC Development Agreement. At
the Planning Commission meeting on May 23, prior to a vote on a resolution recommending to the Board of Supervisors the adoption of the CPMC
DA, a deputy city attorney made the legally preposterous argument that
any collateral agreement would "guarantee successful litigation" against
the City The effect was that four members of the Planning Commission,
who had previously spoken in favor of entering into a collateral agreement
with SFHHJJ, backed down.
In the weeks that followed, SFHHJJ leaders pressed the need for a collateral agreement with the mediator. On June 14, he reported by telephone
to SFHHJJ participants assembled together in a meeting that he had been
unsuccessful in obtaining the support of City administrators and the City
Attorney's Office. They did not want to establish a precedent for having a collateral agreement covering the monitoring of a DA's provisions.
The mediator further explained that while a number of supervisors were
willing to hold out for a commitment by the City to enter into a collateral
agreement with SFHHJJ, CPMC and Sutter Health representatives would
back out of the deal if there were such a commitment. They would regard
any commitment to a collateral agreement with SFHHJJ as a change in the
terms of the DA and would demand a re-opening of negotiations on key
issues. SFHHJJ leaders made the decision not to make a collateral agreement a do-or-die matter. Too much was at stake, and the prospect of a collateral agreement was still open to be raised at a later date. Had SFHHJJ
obtained the guarantee from the City that it wanted, the Development
Agreement in its implementation would have functioned much more as
though it were a Community Benefits Agreement.
Contrastingly, SFHHJJ did prevail on the second procedural issue
regarding the public process for reviewing amendments to the DA. The
draft before the Planning Commission limited the review by the Planning
Commission and the Board of Supervisors of nonmaterial amendments
79. Id. § 56.3(c).

584

Journalof Affordable Housing

Volume 2 7, Number 3

2019

and established an exception to the standard notice and review procedures
for amendments provided in the San Francisco Development Agreements
ordinance. 0 Shortly before a June 17 Board of Supervisors Land Use Committee hearing on the CPMC project, the mediator contacted the SFHHJJ to
report that both the City and Sutter/CPMC agreed to a revision proposed
by SFHHJJ that would restore in full the DA ordinance amendment procedures.8 ' Though not stated by the mediator or anyone else, this change may
have been an attempt at a concession for SFHHJJ having backed away from
insisting on a collateral agreement guarantee. The end result was important, as it avoided potential future disputes over what might be a minor
or material amendment. It also insured that any DA amendment would be
publically noticed and could come before the Planning Commission and
the Board of Supervisors for approval.
The Land Use Committee meeting was the final step before full Board of
Supervisors review of all the documents required to authorize the CPMC
project. With public comments, the Committee meeting lasted several
hours. SFHHJJ participants did not object to the enactment of any authorizing actions. On June 25, the Board of Supervisors certified the final EIR,
initially approved the DA, and authorized several ministerial land-use
decisions. 2 Several of the supervisors publically acknowledged the key
role played by SFHHJJ in the San Francisco's review of the CPMC project.
On July 9, the Board enacted the land-use ordinance amendments needed
and an ordinance giving final approval for the Development Agreement
and authorizing the City Planning Director to execute the DA on behalf of
the City. 3
Four years before in early summer 2009, Tenderloin community organizers had brought together San Francisco neighborhood activists and healthcare union organizers to work in coalition to reshape CPMC's Long Range
Development Plan, to improve low-income patient access to its healthcare
services, and to obtain other project-related community benefits. It was a
long and hard haul. Throughout, the effectiveness of such coalition work
reflected the political and policy astuteness of those in the leadership core
and their ability to garner visible and notable grassroots support.
In providing legal assistance from the start, the Hastings CED Clinic's
role was integral. It involved doing factual and legal research, participating regularly and continually in internal discussions and external meetings
with public officials, and collaborating in the development and refinement
of public positions, including as needed taking the lead in the preparation
and presentation of backup material and arguments. The Clinic's involvement has not been as intense in subsequent years, but it has been similarly
supportive and complementary.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. § 56.15.
CPMC Development Agreement, supra note 5, at 42-43.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
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E.Implementation Monitoring-Dilemmasand Opportunities
The changes made in the Development Agreement were a climactic achievement. The City and CPMC set the final DA's effective date as
August 10, 2013.t The DA's term of applicability is ten years.1S A follow-up
task for SFHHJJ has been and continues to be monitoring the implementation of the DA's community benefits provisions.
While no issues regarding CPMC's payment of its financial obligations
have arisen, the monitoring of its performance-based obligations has been
dilemma-ridden. Participating in the annual compliance-review process
has been frustrating yet also opportune. The chief dilemmas are rooted in
the DA itself and who has direct responsibility for its implementation and
enforcement. The opportunities lie in calling attention not only to CPMC's
performance under the DA but also to related healthcare service issues not
covered by the DA.
As a first matter, the DA spells out a far-from-ideal process for annual
reviews. A main underlying problem has to do with delays in receiving
information and then obtaining a final decision from City decision-makers.
Most reporting is on a calendar-year basis with CPMC's report not due
until the end of May of the following year. 6 With time built-in for public comments, which have been almost exclusively from SFHHJJ, and
a multistep review process that involves a joint hearing before the Planning and Health Commissions, it is not until near the end of the year, and
sometimes even into the next year, that the City issues a final decision on
compliance, at which time pressuring for specific remedial actions comes
across as off-kilter."7 The principal reason is that CPMC shortly thereafter
begins, or already has begun, preparing its report for the recently ended
year. Anyone criticizing CPMC at that time in the review process, whether
with the City or from the community is in a paradoxical position. There is,
practically speaking, a mootness and a ripeness problem. It is too late to
feel comfortable taking decisive action regarding lack of full compliance
based on information a year old not knowing where things now stand,
and it is too early to know fully what happened during the about-to-end
or just-ended year and therefore what corrective actions are still needed.

84. Letter from CPMC attorneys to S.F. Director of Planning, Confirmation of "Effective Date" and "Finally Granted" Date as Defined in the California Pacific Medical Center
Development Agreement" (Nov. 19, 2013).
85. CPMC Development Agreement, supra note 5, at 14.
86. Id. at 32.
87. Copies with dates of CPMC's Compliance Statements, the City's Annual Reports,
Certificates of Compliance, and the Third Party Monitor Letters re: Compliance with
DA Obligations are available online at http://sf-planning.org/cpmc-annual-compliance
-statements. All these written documents are part of the annual review process. The
Third Party Monitor Letters so far have been prepared by the mediator who facilitated
the negotiations leading up to the final DA and have been filed after issuance of the Certificates of Compliance.
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Additional exasperating factors are that the standard for review is not
"actual compliance" but "material compliance," ' and that performancebased public benefits require only "good faith" efforts. 9 In short, the DA's
performance review process is structurally awkward and formally toothless. At the very least, it would have been helpful had the DA provided for
earlier and interim reporting of relevant data and information.
The second dilemma involves ritualistic compliance from CPMC and
City officials, which is not to say that the process from their standpoints
has not been time consuming and labor intensive. Rather, it means that
they have viewed narrowly their roles in the review process. In particular,
opportunities for detailed factual breakdowns of the data presented or for
spelling out pro-active corrective measures and remedial steps have been
disregarded. For CPMC, the paperwork provided mainly comes across as a
checking-the-box process, notwithstanding all sorts of attachments. While
not surprising, CPMC rarely acknowledges in its reports the shortcomings
in its performance or what it intends to do to rectify any problems. The
statements and actions from City officials, for the most part, have had a
similar feel. Some pointed comments have been directed at CPMC's performance by City officials but almost never in the City's annual reports and
final compliance decisions, which have been largely devoid of any suggestions for remedying deficiencies in CPMC's implementation of DA terms.
The City Planning and Health Directors are charged with making the final
decisions. 9 For the four review cycles so far concluded, CPMC has been
found each time to have met its DA obligations.
The third dilemma relates to the previous two dilemmas. It concerns
problematic DA enforcement procedures, which are unlikely to be invoked
and, as directed at CPMC, are at best only a very weak threat. The legal
remedy for a breach of the Development Agreement is specific performance, with provisions for liquidated damages if a CPMC breach involves
a performance-based, not a financial, obligation. 91 The DA includes a
provision that explicitly prohibits any enforcement action by third-party
beneficiaries, 92 which consequently means that any legal action to enforce
the DA's terms only can be instituted by the City or CPMC. SFHHJJ or
anyone else has no standing to seek remedies. Furthermore, with respect
to certain pivotal healthcare delivery obligations, there is an arbitration
provision, which requires that any such dispute be brought before a
mutually agreed private arbitrator. Arbitrations are not public proceedings, and the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award are nar88. CPMC Development Agreement, supra note 5, at 34.
89. For example, these factors relate to compliance with permanent workforce hiring
goals. See id. at 16.
90. Id. at 34.
91. Id. at 36-37.
92. Id. at 35.
93. Id. at 40-41.
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row and usually require corruption, fraud, or comparable misconduct.
Additionally, the greater flexibility in an arbitration as compared to a court
proceeding likely leaves even more room for downplaying performance
deficiencies as meeting standards of "good faith" and "material compliance." In the absence of CPMC flagrantly acting in bad faith, the chances
of the City invoking or even threatening to use the DA's enforcement provisions are next to nil.
A fourth dilemma is internal to SFHHJJ and dynamics of grassroots
organizing, though to date it has not been an impediment. The dilemma
involves two related components: the first is how to sustain over time sufficient grassroots engagement, especially when issues are less high profile;
the second is how to manage inevitable changes in the group's leadership
core.
Challenging CPMC's reconfiguring of its hospitals involved a series
of actions that were highly visible publically, required San Francisco governmental approvals, implicated both neighborhood and labor interests,
affected access to healthcare services, and centered attention on a common
target whose record in serving the poor and bargaining with workers in
a union-supportive city was questionable and provocative. During the
period leading up to the final DA, the organizations that banded together
in coalition maintained throughout a high degree of unity. This unity
reflected a deeply understood sense among the participants that much
could be gained by supporting each other. The mutually shared enhancements in advocacy effectiveness mainly came from sharing internal organizing responsibilities and reaching a pre-public consensus on issues and
how to proceed, a heightened capacity for generating and applying policy
expertise covering a fairly broad range of issues, and a greater capability
in turning out mass support when needed from affected neighborhood
residents and labor union membership. Over time, however, sustaining the
same broad level of grassroots engagement, without a calamitous event, is
a near impossible task
A coalition without its own staff and financial resources depends,
although not exclusively on the time-pressured availability of staff and the
limited financial means of its constituent organizations, which most often
make decisions based on immediate priorities. There are also constraints
on how hard to push issues so as not to lose credibility with public officials, the media, and a coalition's own past, present, and potential supporters. Not all concerns call for a full-court press. Specifically with respect
to CPMC, the monitoring of the DA has been a more pedestrian and less
inclusive undertaking than the concerted effort to shape and affect its
terms. In particular, there has been a drop-off in active participation from
nonprofit affordable housing and other neighborhood organizations. The
main reason is that from their standpoint the DA benefits of most interest
involved cash benefits, most prominently the $36.5 million for affordable
housing, over which there have not been implementation issues regarding
CPMC's compliance.
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Since summer 2013, those most active in SFHHJJ mainly have been
associated with the labor movement or have ongoing interests in San Francisco healthcare policies and CPMC's performance as a healthcare service
provider. Labor union continuing involvement is structurally tied to the
representation of workers at CPMC campuses. For the participating labor
organizations, such involvement also corresponds with long-standing concerns regarding healthcare policies and practices as they affect patients as
well as workers. Both the California Nurses Association and the National
Union of Healthcare Workers have a substantial history of engagement
in San Francisco healthcare policy advocacy, and Jobs with Justice SF, the
other major labor component to SFHHJJ, self-identifies as the progressive
arm of the organized San Francisco labor movement on economic and
social policy issues. In terms of non-labor union participation since the
DA's effective date, the most steady nonprofit staff involvement has come
from a few community organizations, for instance, most recently San Francisco Senior and Disability Action and, since the beginning, the Council of
Community Housing Organizations (CCHO).
Along with changes in the dynamics of organizational participation
have been internal changes in organizational personnel regarding who
functions as the staff representative in SFHHJJ's core leadership, as well as
changes in staff participation from the most active unions and from CCHO.
Until summer 2018, the director of Jobs with Justice SF filled a key role as
SFHHJJ's coordinator. At that time, he resigned his labor-affiliated position to seek a seat on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and reduced
his involvement with SFHHJJ, which totally ended after he was elected in
November. In his place, others have stepped up to schedule meetings, to
set agendas, and to serve as SFHHJJ's contact person.
In light of constituent organization staffing changes, a saving grace for
SFHHJJ has been that among its most engaged participants have been volunteer activists, some unaffiliated and some associated with grassroots
groups with a history of healthcare advocacy such as the Grey Panthers
and the Older Women's League. Most of the volunteer activists are near
or more than 70 years-old. For much of SFHHJJ's history three volunteers
stand out-a retired public health administrator and activist with decadeslong ties to San Francisco groups working with homeless and low-income
individuals, a retired doctor who spent much of his career at St. Luke's
Hospital, and a CCHO founder and long-term, now retired, staff member.
Since 2017, a retired geriatric physician has been highly active with SFHHJJ
in the focus on subacute care beds and other post-acute care services in San
Francisco.
There have been both continuity and fluidity within the SFHHJJ core
leadership, which has varied between a half dozen and dozen people at
any given time. Unquestionably the experience and intelligence of the
aging volunteers has been especially valuable. Looking to the future
however, it is hard to envision that SFHHJJ survives without an influx of
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younger individuals from the staffs of participating organizations or as
highly engaged volunteers.
An additional constant in SFHHJJ's work has been the Hastings CED
Clinic. In the nine years since community organizers created a coalition to
challenge CPMC's Long Range Development Plan, relatively few meetings
and plans for actions have taken place without the participation of Clinic
law students or lawyers. Like other organizational involvements, there
have been shifts in personnel. While the institutional reason for Clinic participation rests on giving students hands-on lawyering experience, student
direct involvement is not always feasible when providing long-term representation. Crucial moments occur when classes are not in session. Curricular staffing and enrollment also affect law school clinic offerings. At those
times, clinic faculty have had to assume the primary role.
In summer 2013, I formally retired and became an emeritus professor.
Fortunately my colleague Ascanio Piomelli decided to take on the directorship of the CED Clinic. I have continued to participate in SFHHJJ work as
a pro bono Clinic lawyer. In terms of what has needed to be done, Piomelli
has taken the lead in working with SFHHJJ on the monitoring of the Development Agreement and on miscellaneous assignments.94 Whenever opportune, he has involved two-person or three-person teams of law students. I
have served as legal backup and for the last few years as lead lawyer on
the various issues that have arisen around post-acute care services in San
Francisco.
For SFHHJJ, monitoring the DA has not been just about the implementation of its terms. It also has been an opportunity for seeking to affect
CPMC's healthcare service delivery practices in other ways and for calling
attention to citywide healthcare service delivery problems generally. SFHHJJ's credibility and visibility as a community-based advocate leading up
to the DA have carried over into the post-DA period. While direct interchanges with CPMC's administrative staff have been erratic, SFHHJJ has
had a constructive continuing relationship with San Francisco Department
of Public Health officials, including meetings with the director and other
high level administrators, and has maintained strong ties with members

94. In our respective writings on community and social justice lawyering, Piomelli
and I have tended to focus on somewhat different issues and analytic concerns. For Piomelli, see, e.g., Asconio Piomelli, Rebellious Heroes, 23 CLINICAL L.REV. 283 (2016); Ascanio
Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383 (2009); Ascanio
Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 541 (2006);
Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault'sApproach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395 (2004); Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating CollaborativeLawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427 (2000). For Aaronson, see, e.g., sources cited infra note 100.
From my observations in our working with SFHHJJ, he and I have varied little in how we
have approached lawyering roles and have carried out counseling and representational
responsibilities.
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of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors even as the Board's composition changes. SFHHJJ also has served as a fulcrum for healthcare advocacy
for others in San Francisco, particularly patient groups targeted for service
cutbacks by CPMC. On the downside, SFHHJJ has not been able as part
of the annual review process to persuade the City to agree to a collateral
agreement, where SFHHJJ would have a contractual role in monitoring
aspects of the DA's implementation. Strong opposition has continued to
come from the City Attorney's office.
Focusing on explicit DA provisions, the problematic implementation
issues of primary concern to SFHHJJ have involved both healthcare and
non-healthcare matters. As to non-healthcare issues, CPMC was slow in
establishing a public transit subsidy program for its employees and in
meeting the local hire target goals for permanent entry level positions. The
former did not begin until January 2017, rather than two years earlier as
set forth in the DA. Suggesting lackluster promotion of the program, only
eighteen percent of CPMC's workforce so far has taken advantage of the
subsidy.9" Regarding its permanent workforce, CPMC did not meet the
forty percent local hire target goal the first year but has exceeded it in subsequent years. An unexpected twist is that CPMC's overall hiring for new
entry level positions, as computed for the 2017 annual report, was lower
than was assumed it would be during the DA negotiations. There were
only fifty-eight new employees hired, of which thirty-three (fifty-seven
percent) came from targeted low-income San Francisco neighborhoods. 6
Neither CPMC nor the City has provided an explanation for the reported
downturn in hiring.
With respect to healthcare, the main DA implementation issues have
concerned provisions directed at increasing access for Medi-Cal and other
low-income individuals to CPMC hospital facilities. One example is a provision requiring that CPMC provide hospital-based services to 1,500 new
Medi-Cal patients living in the Tenderloin. There have been practical complications due to both a lack of a qualified medical clinic in the Tenderloin to make Managed Medi-Cal coverage referrals and the distance from
the Tenderloin to the existing CPMC campuses. The campus on the border
of the Tenderloin, now named the Van Ness Campus (not Cathedral Hill
Campus), is scheduled to open in March 2019. As of May 2018, only 176
Tenderloin beneficiaries had enrolled in the specific program. 97 Another
example involves the baselines and targets set for providing services to
unduplicated Medi-Cal and charity care patients from throughout San
Francisco. Specific problems raised by SFHHJJ concern whether a countable service includes outpatient treatment, not just inpatient hospitaliza95. Annual City Report on 2017 CPMC Compliance Statement 70 (Aug. 8, 2018),
http://default.sfplanning.org/publications-reports/cpmc/2017-Annual-City-Report
_LongRangeDevelopmentPlan.pdf.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 35.
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tion, and the sampling methodology used for determining the number of
patients being served. Other areas of concern have been changes in staffing at the Diabetes Center on the St. Luke's (now Mission Bernal) Campus that have resulted in no bilingual professionals, or even a receptionist,
being permanently assigned to serve a substantial Spanish monolingual
patient population; the lack of advanced planning for Senior and Community Health Centers of Excellence at the new Mission Bernal Hospital; and
major reductions in hospital-based Skilled Nursing Facilities on CPMC
campuses.
During each annual compliance review period, SFHHJJ submits written comments in response to CPMC's Compliance Statement and critically
reviews the City's subsequent Annual Report regarding CPMC's compliance. A joint Planning and Health Commissions hearing is held at least
thirty days after the publication of the City's Report and prior to a final
compliance decision by the directors of the Planning Department and
Department of Public Health. At the hearing, SFHHJJ members in an organized presentation provide public testimony highlighting shortcomings
and oversights in the two formal reports. In consultation with SFHHJJ
activists, the CED Clinic director prepares and submits SFHHJJ's written
comments and usually joins in providing oral testimony at the hearing.
Because of insufficient attention to or resolution of problems identified by
SFHHJJ, its comments and testimony each year have a familiar and recurring ring.
Although direct gains for SFHHJJ's constituents from its participation
in the compliance review process have been limited, its perseverance has
not been misdirected. The chief benefits and advantages have been institutional. Such participation legitimates on a regular basis SFHHJJ's position
as a major advocate for grassroots concerns in interactions with CPMC.
By not backing away after the DA negotiations, SFHHJJ has remained a
thorn in CPMC's side. At the very least, CPMC has had to take into account
that SFHHJJ's ongoing scrutiny could lead to unwanted public attention
and consequent costs, politically and economically. SFHHJJ's persistence
also has meant that City officials have continued to take its positions seriously. SFHHJJ has been able to nudge public officials to pressure CPMC,
and to place and frame issues on the public healthcare agenda, in ways
that otherwise might not have happened. Lastly SFHHJJ's ongoing public
visibility has meant that concerned individuals and groups not previously
active in its advocacy know where to seek support or to join as a participating member.
On August 24, 2018, Sutter Health/CPMC heralded the opening of its
new Mission Bernal Campus with a Blue Ribbon Cutting Ceremony. As
reported to me, a former CPMC executive, who ran into a retired physician
activist at the Blue Ribbon Ceremony said, "I wanted to close this place
down. You wanted to keep it open. You won." A hospital that CPMC at
first had no interest in building, and then questionable interest in keeping open, was now lauded as a major step forward in healthcare service
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delivery in San Francisco. SFHHJJ activists had mixed feelings. There still
was a viable hospital on the St. Luke's site. Yet, there was every reason to
be skeptical about whether the services provided would be as accessible
and as tailored to meet the needs of a low-income patient population as
they were at the old St. Luke's Hospital.
IV. Accessibility, Responsiveness, and Judgment
Functionally fulfilling a role similar to an in-house counsel, the Hastings
CED Clinic was an active participant in almost all of the advocacy planning and actions described in this article. Sometimes the Clinic took the initiative in identifying a not-obvious assignment and carrying it out. Good
examples were the Clinic's keeping tabs on CPMC's Long Range Development Plan during a quiescent period prior to 2009 and the preparation of
the Profits & Patientsreport. Other times the Clinic took on a major assignment that lawyers, if available, ordinarily would handle, for instance, the
extensive work undertaken as part of the Environmental Impact Report
process and the principal drafting of SFHHJJ's comments on the annual
CPMC Compliance Statement. Much of the time, the Clinic's and SFHHJJ's
interactions were interwoven into a single fabric of advocacy A notable
example of the distinctive contribution of lawyers, though still working
closely with other SFHHJJ participants, was the formulation of the legal
basis for seeking an affordable housing mitigation fee from CPMC. No
matter what the task and circumstances, the Clinic's effectiveness inworking with SFHHJJ and the predecessor coalitions owed much to the political, policy, and organizational sophistication of their lead activists.
Equally important, however, was the Clinic's approach to lawyering for
progressive social change. As I noted earlier in this article, much rests on
a lawyer's sense of role and self-discipline in role performance. The key
attributes that I emphasize are accessibility, responsiveness, and judgment.
They are not skills per se but instead are inner dispositions, habits, or mindsets that bear on how one exercises various skills and seeks to achieve client goals. In my conception of good lawyering, they are pivotal underlying
virtues. Their cultivation orients lawyers on what to do to complement and
supplement actions of grassroots activists in ways that are supportive and
not undermining in achieving short-term and long-term objectives.
Accessibility is not a usual term in the lawyering literature, but it is
not an out-of-place idea. Indeed, in terms of client complaints about lawyers, one of the most common, and probably the most common, is that
"my lawyer won't get back to me or return my phone call."9 Accessibility also fully resonates with conceptions of client centeredness, which in
the shaping of understandings about best practice client relationships has
become the single most dominant idea in contemporary clinical legal education. The touchstone for client centeredness is a profound respect for the
98. Tom McNichol, Up Against the Bar, DAILY JOURNAL (Jan. 2, 2009), https://www
.dailyjournal.com /articles/ 248907-up-against-the-bar.
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perspectives, viewpoints, and autonomy of others. 99 The notion of accessibility adds a dimension that goes to a lawyer's genuine openness and
actual availability to clients in ways that enhance meaningful professional
relationships. Telling the group to "call me when you need me" will not do
the job.
If one structural element in the Clinic's working relationship with
SFHHJJ has mattered the most, it was the regular attendance by students
and faculty members at coalition meetings and their capabilities in listening attentively to what others had to say In grassroots coalitions, lawyers
need to convey a strong sense of presence, but not in a dominating manner
if they strive to be viewed as genuinely accessible. An especially important
benefit of such presence is the furtherance of mutual trust.
Responsiveness and judgment lie at the core of what it means to act
responsibly and effectively with or on behalf of others. They are complementary concepts whose development and application are contextually
specific and largely dependent on learning from practical experience. As
I have written extensively elsewhere about each, I provide here only brief
summary descriptions.' My own ideas heavily draw on concepts from
normative political theory.0
Responsiveness involves paying attention to big-picture issues and
telling details. As a lawyer, responsiveness begins with a shared appreciation of purpose with those represented. The lawyer has to understand
the priority values, interests, concerns, and goals of clients and commit to
seeking their accomplishment. The strength of this bond of understanding greatly depends on the integrity of the lawyer-that is, his or her continuing willingness to act consistently with the encompassing reason for
the representation. The overarching shared sense of purpose then needs
to be formulated into concrete objectives that address particular problems.
This narrowing of focus raises questions of substance and means. There
are always choices to be made about what issues to address and what
approaches or techniques to use to advance the interests of those assisted.
99. See

DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, PAUL R. TREMBLAY & IAN S. WEINSTEIN.,

LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH

(3d ed. 2012).

100. Mark Neal Aaronson, Representing the Poor: Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform
during Reagan's GubernatorialYears, 64 HASTINGS L. J. 933, 956-59, 966-76, 1081-93 (2013);
Mark Neal Aaronson, Thinking Like a Fox: Four Overlapping Domains of Good Lawyering, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 30-42 (2002); Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning
About PracticalJudgment in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L.REV. 247 (1998).
101. See, e.g., HANNA FENICHEL

PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION

209 (1967).

Drawing on ideas from traditional normative political theory, Pitkin in this seminal book
presents a conceptual analysis of modern democratic representation. While she was not
addressing lawyering, strong parallels exist from her writings to what it means to provide responsible legal representation and assistance. In describing the purpose of her
analysis, Pitkin states, "Learning what 'representation' means and learning how to represent are intimately connected." Id. at 1.There are also here strong parallels to the need for
critical self-reflection to best learn from one's lawyering experiences.
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In a word, the lawyer has to be resourceful and flexible and always be
mindful of what matters the most to the client.
Rigidity is the bane of responsive lawyering. The resourcefulness and
flexibility associated with responsiveness continually call for critical assessment of situational factors and one's own role. Determinations about the
appropriateness of actions undertaken have to take into account direct and
indirect effects and consequences that both further and push back against
the client's objectives. Being responsive requires anticipating and adjusting
to what needs to be done, to having a sense of proportion, and to not being
doctrinaire or just reactive. In what is a reiterative process, the responsive
lawyer is ever alert to the need to adapt and to make adjustments in light
of changing circumstances and new insights.
The Clinic's involvement with CPMC started with my sensing an opportunity to obtain a Community Benefits Agreement (CBA). Several initial
Good Neighbors Coalition and then SFHHJJ participants were skeptical
about the feasibility of a CBA. They favored a Development Agreement
(DA), an approach to binding private parties that had been successfully
used in the past in San Francisco. The downsides of a DA are that community groups typically do not have a seat at the table and the benefits
negotiated by governmental agencies are more likely to be weak and more
symbolic than real. For CBAs to happen, the private party needs to be willing to negotiate in good faith with a grassroots coalition. With respect to
CPMC, that never was the case. An idea that might have been feasible in
other circumstance was not in the cards. SFHHJJ with the full backing of
the Clinic, rightly focused on setting the stage for a DA that did make a difference and did provide real community benefits.
By judgment, I mean "practical judgment," which is a process of reasoning directed at action or policy not abstract theoretical issues. The crux of
practical judgment is what the political theorist Hannah Arendt translating
from the French le bon sens called "the good sense."'0 2
Effective exercises of judgment ultimately depend on the ability to persuade others of the good sense of one's position. The idea of "good" in
good sense speaks to the importance of an individual's moral as well as
intellectual development. In lawyering, both are essential. Lawyers can
problem-solve and manipulate information and situations shrewdly. Too
often, however, such behavior can belie what it means to say someone
has good practical judgment. Losing or burying a document in discovery
might cleverly work, but no one is going to say that a lawyer who has so
acted has good judgment.
Arendt characterized applying good sense to influence decision-making
as a process of wooing.0 3 Her idea of wooing is highly respectful of the
autonomy of others. It is about educating, not manipulating, people. While
102. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 221 (1977).
103. Id. at 222.
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the notion of wooing sounds awkward in a lawyering context, Arendt's
description actually fits quite well, especially when trying to help someone
else make a decision-for example, a lawyer's role in counseling. To do
this well, an attorney has to know the client's concerns and values, to have
the trust of the client, and to convey information and advice in ways most
likely to be heard and understood.
No one can teach good judgment. It is something that develops, if at all,
with experience. Making mistakes and learning from them are a crucial
part of the experience. It is possible, however, to help law students and
lawyers to exercise better judgment than they otherwise might have. 1" 4 One
constant factor is to examine critically one's experiences-to be explicitly
self-reflective. Another is patience because developing judgment involves
a deep internalization of past knowledge and experience, which does
not happen overnight. An especially important step is learning what is
involved in exercising judgment.
In this regard, I have emphasized five key characteristics as central to
the kind of judgment needed in lawyering. They are (1) the contextual tailoring of knowledge and experience, (2) a dialogic form of reasoning that
accounts for multiple points of view, (3) an ability to be empathetic and
detached at the same time, (4) the intertwining of intellectual and moral
1 5
concerns, and (5) an instrumental and equitable interest in human affairs. C
These descriptive features are overlapping, rather than distinct and separate. All were at play in how the CED Clinic worked in coalition.
The background details provided in this article's narrative section set a
context for understanding why particular decisions were made and specific courses of action were pursued. There were judgment calls, and they
were not made precipitously. The strategies and tactics involved the targeted tailoring of collective knowledge and experience and were the product of thoughtful group discussions that took into account the views and
interests of constituent organizations, allies, public officials, and adversaries. Attorney expertise and initiative had a role but in a highly collaborative
and integrative manner. The extent to which SFHHJJ was able to influence
major terms of the DA was unusual. It would not have happened without
lay leaders exercising sound practical judgment. The key to effective lawyering was fully appreciating specific circumstances and knowing when,
in what ways, and how much to contribute to the group decision-making
process.

104. For how I have sought to accomplish this objective, see Mark Neal Aaronson,
Judgment-Based Lawyering: Structuring Seminar Time in a Non-Litigation Clinic, in SUSAN
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105. For background sources and a full explication of my reasons for emphasizing
these characteristics, see Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider,supra note 100, at 250-85.
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The critical dynamic in developing good lawyering judgment is the ability to be both empathetic and detached.0 6 For everyone, it is always hard
to put oneself in someone else's shoes. It requires imagination and compassion. It is never done perfectly But it is absolutely necessary in helping
others make decisions in light of what matters most to them. Detachment
is also challenging, especially for a lawyer committed to the cause of a
client group. One has to distance oneself not only from feelings for others, which are at the heart of empathy, but also from one's own feelings.
The distancing is essential because it is important to account for the whole
picture-both supportive and opposing information and aspects. Because
empathy and detachment are in tension with one another, reconciling the
two is difficult.
As a lawyer for SFHHJJ, I cared strongly about a lot of the issues. As
part of my sense of role conception, I chose not to vote the few times there
was an actual vote. I also refrained from explicitly joining in any consensus decision. Though what I was doing was probably more symbolic than
tangible, not voting kept me alert to the value of providing professional
counseling and not getting overly caught up in the emotions of a situation.
It also lowered the prospect of my inadvertently jeopardizing the trust and
confidence of those within the coalition who viewed matters differently
Public policies have both intellectual and moral content. To get things
done politically groups need to act instrumentally. But fairness and equity
also count, even during dark political times. Healthcare is the kind of issue
where moral claims have political appeal. SFHHJJ well understood this
connection. In the San Francisco political arena, CPMC found itself on the
wrong side. Its bottom-line financial interests were too evident. Not wholly
but importantly because of the moral appeal of its positions, SFHHJJ was
able to outmaneuver CPMC. The San Francisco political order responded
far more favorably than anyone would have expected at the beginning of
the struggle, especially when SFHHJJ was able to utilize favorable landuse and environmental laws. In the end, however, grassroots pressure and
public official outcries had limitations. With respect to healthcare policies,
CPMC had and still has the law on its side and full autonomy to decide
what healthcare services to provide.
V. Conclusion: Internal Dynamics and External Circumstances
For almost a decade, a coalition of neighborhood and citywide groups,
nonprofit affordable housing organizations, labor unions, and individual
activists, which came to be known as San Franciscans for Healthcare,
Housing, Jobs, and Justice (SFHHJJ), generated sufficient political pressure
to cause the largest fee-for-service private hospital chain in San Francisco
to alter substantially its development plans and to be called, repeatedly
and publically, into account for its failure to do its fair share in meeting
106. See
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the healthcare needs of San Franciscans, especially low-income residents.
While there were fluctuating levels of involvement depending upon the
specific issue, SFHHJJ throughout maintained enough constituent group
support and accompanying cohesiveness to be a credible, repeat player
in San Francisco politics. A potential source of division-differences in
union and neighborhood priorities-turned out to be a political strength.
SFHHJJ's core participants early on recognized that much could be gained
by sticking together and working in mutual alliance. There was more political and policy expertise to draw on and a greater ability to turn out mass
supporters when needed.
SFHHJJ is a successful example of diverse groups working in coalition
for progressive social change. But the future is fraught with uncertainty.
Particularly for an informally structured coalition like SFHHJJ, survival is
fragile.
The ever-present internal challenges are to be continually responsive to
issues affecting ordinary and especially low-income San Franciscans and to
sustain, rekindle, broaden, and deepen neighborhood, labor, and citywide
organizational involvement in its activities. The assistance and support of
the CED Clinic have been productive and have provided a stabilizing presence. How and what the Clinic does going forward is a work in progress,
with the exact roles and assignments for lawyers and law students still to
be determined.
There are, as well, external challenges. SFHHJJ has to contend with
always changing political and social circumstances. During the past
decade, changes in the national economy and politics and, specifically
in healthcare policies and practices have been especially dramatic. The
nation's economy has gone from a deep recession to a substantial recovery but with striking inequalities. Politically, rarely have changes in presidencies had such a pervasive and, at the moment, disruptive impact on
the entire society. For healthcare policies and practices, the prime example
is the unsettling effects of the ups and downs of Obamacare and shifting
expectations about federal involvement and financial support.
Local circumstances are overwhelmingly important. In San Francisco,
factors such as a large immigrant population, homelessness, housing costs,
and traffic congestion all have major effects on the delivery of healthcare
services. In terms of local politics, so much depends on personal relationships, and constant changes in office have occurred. Since 2008, the City
has had four different mayors, and, come January 2019, there will be a
complete turnover in who sits on the Board of Supervisors. A recent surprising development has been the late summer 2018 resignation of the
Public Health Director with whom SFHHJJ had a constructive relationship.0 7 Such changes set new opportunities and new obstacles for grassroots activists.
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All of this is to say that social-cause lawyering is highly circumstantial. It is why I chose to provide a detailed narrative of the Hastings CED
Clinic's work with SFHHJJ. It is also why I emphasize as lawyering virtues the importance of accessibility, responsiveness, and judgment. Good
lawyering encompasses much more than the law. In progressive lawyering
especially, the decisive factors are how one interacts with client groups and
what in addition to the law one takes into account in a specific context.
Particularly at this time, when partisan divisions are extreme, a striking
need exists to bring constituent groups together in coalition to transcend
tribalism and negative aspects of identity politics, to fight for progressive
social change, and to resist an onslaught of authoritarian challenges to our
constitutional ideals and commitment to the rule of law. In such efforts,
lawyers who are accessible, responsive, and capable of good judgment are
the ones who will be most valuable.

